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Abstract
Five attributes of emission generating technologies are identified and a concept of by-
production is introduced, which implies these five attributes. Murty and Russell [2010]
characterization of technologies, which requires distinguishing between intended produc-
tion of firms and nature’s laws of emission generation, is shown to be both necessary and
sufficient for by-production. While intended production could be postulated to satisfy
standard input and output free-disposability, these will necessarily be violated by nature’s
emission generation mechanism, which satisfies costly disposability of emission as defined
in Murty [2010]. Marginal technical and economic costs of abatement are derived for tech-
nologies exhibiting by-production. The former measures the loss in intended outputs when
the firm is mandated to reduce emissions, while the latter measures its loss in profits under
regulation. The by-production approach reveals a rich set of abatement options available
to firms. These include reductions in the use of fuel inputs, inter-fuel substitution, increase
in cleaning-up efforts, and technological change. In a simple model of by-production, we
show that, when faced with regulation, the firm will use all or some of these strategies.
This is in contrast to the standard input-approach to modeling emission generating tech-
nologies, where we show that, under a Pigouvian tax, a firm will reduce its emissions,
solely, by increasing its cleaning-up effort. The standard input-approach also allows some
paths of inputs and outputs, which seem inconsistent with nature’s laws of emission gen-
eration, to become technologically feasible. Our model of by-production illustrates that,
while common abatement paths considered in the literature do involve a technological
trade-off between emission reduction and intended production, there also almost always
exist abatement paths where it is possible to have both greater emission reductions and
greater intended outputs. Further, marginal abatement costs will usually be decreasing
in the initial level of emissions of firms. Counterintuitive as these results may sound in
the first instance, they are intuitively obvious in the by-production approach as it is rich
enough to incorporate both standard economic assumptions, such as diminishing returns,
with respect to intended production of firms and the rules of nature that govern emission
generation.
Keywords: theory of a firm, technology, input and output free-disposability, diminishing
returns to inputs, joint production, emission-generation, marginal abatement cost.
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On the theory of a firm: The case of by-production of emissions
by Sushama Murty
1. Introduction.
What are the essential attributes of the process of emission generation by firms when
they engage in the production of their intended outputs?
Firstly, in nature, there are certain goods that cause emissions under certain physical
conditions. If, in the process of their intended production, firms create such conditions and
employ these emission causing goods as inputs or produce these emission causing goods as
their intended outputs, then they trigger-off the nature’s emission generating mechanism
and generate emissions as by-products or incidental outputs of their intended production.1
Secondly, a distinction needs to be made between inputs of emission generation and
inputs of intended production. The emission causing inputs used by a firm in its intended
production or the emission causing intended outputs produced by a firm are the inputs of
emission generation. They have a special property: they exhibit non-rivalness or jointness
in emission generation and intended production: the use of such inputs to produce intended
outputs does not reduce their availability for emission generation, and the fact that some
intended outputs serve also as inputs of emission generation does not reduce the amounts
of such goods that the firms can offer for sale in markets.2
Thirdly, technologies of firms producing emissions as by-products do not satisfy free-
disposability of emissions3: for every given vector of the emission producing inputs used
by the firm or the emission producing outputs produced by the firm, there is a certain
minimal amount of emission that will always be generated. Technical inefficiencies may
imply that the firm can be generating more (but not less) than this minimum amount of
emission.4 On the other hand, a given vector of inputs is also associated with a menu
of maximum possible combinations of intended outputs that are technologically feasible.
Technical efficiencies may imply that the firm produces less (but not more) than these
efficient amounts of intended outputs.
Fourthly, all the above attributes may imply systematic correlations between emis-
sion generation and intended production. If emissions are generated by certain inputs of
1 For example, an emission causing input is coal. Emission of a strong odor can be caused by intended
outputs such as cheese of a dairy.
2 The same amount of coal produces both smoke and electricity. The fact that cheese produced by a
dairy is an input into production of strong odor (a by-product of the dairy) does not reduce the amount
of cheese that the dairy can sell.
3 Intuitively, a technology satisfies output free disposability if a given level of output is producible from
a given vector of inputs implies that any lower level of output is also producible from the same vector of
inputs. A technology satisfies input free disposability if a given level of input can produce a given vector
of outputs implies that any higher level of input can also produce the same vector of outputs. These
definitions allow for the possibility that firms can be operating technically inefficiently.
4 Murty [2010] calls this “costly disposability” and provides two definitions of this term, one of which
is the polar opposite of the standard definition of free disposability of output employed in the literature.
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intended production, then increases in the use of these inputs by firms implies a greater
production of both emissions and the intended outputs.5 If emissions are generated by
certain intended outputs of the firm then, for a fixed vector of all inputs, an increase in the
scale of production of these outputs (by diverting more of the inputs into their production)
leads to a greater generation of emissions and lower production of the remaining intended
outputs.6
Fifthly, by diverting some of their resources towards cleaning-up activities from pro-
duction of intended goods, firms can mitigate emission generation.7 But this comes at the
cost of lower production of intended goods.
Many of the emissions generated by firms impose external effects (beneficial or detri-
mental) on the rest of the society. Efforts to reduce (increase) harmful (beneficial) emis-
sions are often costly for the generators as they usually entail changing the profitable scale
of their intended production activities. Hence, in the absence of additional incentives, the
generating firms will not voluntarily internalize, in their decisions, the external effects on
the rest of the society caused by by-products such as emissions that they produce.
A first step in designing policies that provide incentives to firms to regulate the
generation of such by-products is a thorough understanding of the inextricable link between
emission generation and intended production. In the case of harmful emissions, such an
exercise delineates the various options available to firms to abate emission generation and
their associated costs. The aims of this paper are to provide an understanding of this link
and to identify and assess the costs of various abatement strategies available to firms.
The literature usually models emission generating technologies with the help of a
single production relation between inputs, intended outputs, and emissions.8 Such a pro-
duction relation is assumed to exhibit a positive relation between intended outputs and
emission generation. Such a positive relation is introduced either by bestowing the emis-
sion with properties of a standard input9 or by treating it as an output that possesses
5 Increases in coal used increases both the level of smoke produced and the level of electricity generated.
6 For a given amount of milk, an increase in cheese production implies increase in the amount of odor
generated and a decrease in the amount of butter produced by the dairy (as the use of the milk to produce
greater amount of the cheese decreases the amount of milk for producing butter).
7 Cleaning-up activities to reduce emissions generated include end-of pipe treatment plants, recycling,
etc.
8 See, e.g., the classic text in environmental economics by Baumol and Oates [1988] and Cropper and
Oates [1992].
9 For the input approach see, e.g., Baumol and Oates [1988] and Cropper and Oates [1992]. This is often
justified by considering the amount of the emission generated as a proxy for the amount of the assimilative
capacity of environmental resources such as air and water used to absorb it. However, a clear distinction
needs to be made between environmental resources, which definitely serve as inputs of emission generation,
and emission itself, which is an (incidental) output of production. A given environmental resource like air
can absorb different types of emissions like CO2, SO2, etc., and its assimilative capacity can be different
for different emissions. See Murty [2010] for this distinction. In this paper we do not model the use of
environmental resources as inputs of emission generation. However, see Footnote 37 for a potential way
of doing so.
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a radial disposability property (called weak disposability) that is weaker than standard
output free-disposability.10
Murty and Russell [2010] show that a single production relation between inputs of
intended production, intended outputs, and the emission is not rich enough to capture
all the trade-offs between goods that are exhibited by an emission generating technol-
ogy.11 Early works of Frisch [1965], which have recently been applied by Førsund [2009]
in the context of pollution generating technologies, show the need for multiple production
relations for modeling technologies where some inputs and outputs exhibit technological
non-rivalness/jointness. Murty and Russell [2010] show that all the above attributes of
emission generation by firms can be captured in a model of a technology that is derived
as an intersection of two technologies: (i) a technology defined by laws of nature regard-
ing emission generation and (ii) a technology defined by the relation between inputs and
outputs in intended production. Standard free disposability assumptions can be assumed
for (ii), but (i) will necessarily violate free-disposability of both emission generation and
the inputs that cause emissions in nature. As a result, the observed technology derived as
an intersection of (i) and (ii) violates free disposability of both emissions and inputs that
cause the emissions.
In Section 2, we provide a motivating example that shows the inadequacy of a sin-
gle production relation in capturing all the above five features of emission generation by
firms. In Section 3, we provide a definition of “by-production (BP).” Technologies that
satisfy (BP) have all the five attributes of emission generation mentioned above. We show
that such technologies violate standard disposability assumptions and that the Murty and
Russell [2010] characterization is both a necessary and sufficient characterization of tech-
nologies that satisfy (BP). In particular, such a characterization implies that the emissions
generated by a firm do not impose external effects on its own production of intended out-
puts.12 On the other hand, when such external effects are present, then we show that
technologies of emission generating firms may violate the fourth and fifth attributes of
emission generating technologies mentioned above. Such technologies satisfy a weaker
condition (WBP) than (BP). In Section 4, we give four examples to illustrate all the
results in Section 3.
In Section 5, we provide an application of our by-production approach to the identi-
fication of various options open to firms for abating emissions and their associated costs.
In the context of a simple model that exhibits by-production, we define the marginal tech-
nical abatement costs and the marginal economic abatement cost. Various factors that
affect these marginal costs of abatement are unravelled and their properties are explained
in terms of standard assumptions made in economics regarding intended production by
firms. In the context of a simple model that satisfies (BP), we find that while common
abatement paths considered in the literature do involve a technological trade-off between
10 For the output approach with weak disposability, see Shephard [1953], Fa¨re, Grosskopf, Noh, and
Yaisawarng [1993], Fa¨re, Grosskopf, and Pasurka [1986], Fa¨re, Grosskopf, Lovell, and Pasurka [1989],
Fa¨re, Grosskopf, Noh, and Weber [2005], and Murty and Kumar [2002, 2003] among others.
11 This is true both in the presence or absence of cleaning-up options available to firms.
12 It may impose external effects on the rest of the society though.
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emission reduction and intended production, there also almost always exist abatement
paths where it is possible to have both greater emission reductions and greater intended
outputs. We also find that marginal abatement costs are usually decreasing in the initial
level of emissions of firms. Counterintuitive as these results may sound in the first instance,
they are intuitively obvious when we adopt the by-production approach to modeling emis-
sion generating technologies as it is rich enough to incorporate both standard economic
assumptions with respect to intended technologies of firms and the rules of nature that
govern emission generation. We also compare the effects of emission regulation under the
conventional input approach with the by-production approach. We conclude in Section 6.
Most proofs are simple and are relegated to the appendix.
2. Notation and a motivating example.
2.1. Notation.
The commodity-space in which technologies are empirically observed is the space
Rn+m+2+ formed by the coordinates R
m+1
+ reserved for m intended outputs and a cleaning-
up activity of the firm 〈y, c〉 ∈ Rm+1+ , Rn+ reserved for n inputs x ∈ Rn+, and R+
reserved for the by-product z ∈ R+.13 We index inputs by i and intended outputs
by j. We assume that, in nature, inputs 1, . . . , n1 cause emissions, while the remain-
ing n2 = n − n1 inputs do not. Similarly, intended outputs 1, . . . ,m1 cause emissions,
while the remaining m2 = m − m1 intended outputs do not. Likewise, we partition
the input and intended output vectors into x = 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ Rn1+n2+ and y = 〈y1, y2〉 ∈
Rm1+m2+ , respectively. Let T ⊂ Rn+m+2+ denote a technology of the firm in the em-
pirically observed space of commodities. Define also various restrictions of T such as
PT (x, y, c) := {z ≥ 0| 〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ T}, PT (x, y−j , c, z) := {yj ≥ 0| 〈x, y−j , yj , c, z〉 ∈ T},
and PT (x, y
−j , c) = {〈z, yj〉 ∈ R2+| 〈x, y−j , yj , c, z〉 ∈ T} for all j = 1, . . . ,m.
2.2. A motivating example.
Consider the case where a firm employs wood, water, chemicals, labor, and capital
as inputs to produce paper (y ∈ R+). Wood and chemicals (x1 ∈ R+ and x2 ∈ R+)
leave behind residuals which are the emissions (z ∈ R+) of paper production. Thus,
x1 = 〈x1, x2〉 and x2 = 〈x3, x4, x5〉. The larger the amount of chemicals and wood used
by the firm, the greater is the maximal amount of paper it can produce and the greater is
also the minimal level of emissions that it can generate. Consider any single production
relation that satisfies standard assumptions with respect to the intended output and all
13 For the sake of notational ease, we restrict our analysis to a single emission generated by any firm.
We believe that the analysis can be generalized to the case of multiple emissions. It can be shown, along
the lines of the analysis to follow, that in the case a firm generates more than one emission, more than
two production relations may be required to characterize its technology.
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inputs and aims to capture the positive correlation between emission generation and paper
production. One such example is
y = fy(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, z) =
5∏
i=1
x
1
5
i z. (2.1)
The implied technology of the firm is14
T = {〈x1, . . . , x5, y, z〉 ∈ R7+| y ≤
5∏
i=1
x
1
5
i z}. (2.2)
The technically efficient production vectors are those that satisfy (2.1). Such a relation
is inadequate to capture all the attributes of emission generation mentioned in Section 1
because of the following reasons.
(i) It implies that along the efficient frontier, the trade-offs between the residual and the
chemical and wood inputs is negative which contradicts the fact that these inputs
cause the residual:
∂z
∂xi
=
−1
5xi
∏
i′ 6=i x
1
5
i′
< 0 ∀ i = 1, 2. (2.3)
(ii) (2.1) implies that for a fixed vector of all inputs 〈x1, . . . , x5〉, there is a whole menu of
efficient paper and residual combinations ( see Figure 1(a)).15 This also contradicts
the fact that the minimal amount of the residual generated changes if and only if
the levels of the chemical or wood inputs change. Similarly, the maximal amount of
paper produced can change if and only if inputs of paper production change.16 This
implies that if all inputs are held fixed, then there exist only one efficient combination
of residual and paper that the firm can produce.
(iii) Figure 1(a) also shows that, at fixed level of all inputs, the efficient level of paper
produced increases when the level of residual increase and that the menu of efficient
paper-residual combinations in unbounded. This can be true only if the residual
imposes a positive externality on paper production, i.e., the residual is a productive
input into paper production–which would seem counter-intuitive.
The literature17 would justify production relations of the type (2.1) by assuming the
existence of implicit cleaning-up options available to the paper producing firm, e.g., an
aﬄuent treatment plant that cleans up the residual generated: holding the vector of all
inputs (including chemicals and wood) fixed, the firm can be diverting more of the inputs
14 Note, that this technology is consistent with both the input and output approaches to modeling
emissions that are seen in the standard literature: it treats emission like an input and also satisfies the
weak-disposability assumption of Shephard [1953].
15 PT (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) in the figure is the restriction of T to the space of y and z for the given input
vector.
16 This is true assuming that the residuals do not generate external effects on paper production.
17 See references in Footnotes 9 and 10 in Section 1.
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into cleaning-up activities, so that less of both residuals and paper are produced. If such a
perspective is adopted to interpret (2.1), then (2.2) is only a reduced-form description of the
technology, as it does not explicitly model cleaning-up efforts. The full technology lies in
the space of all goods–intended outputs, inputs, cleaning-up activities, and the emissions.
Thus, the full technology would involve another production relation, in addition to (2.1),
that explicitly involves cleaning-up options available to the firm. More importantly, if
we require the technology to satisfy attributes one to five of emission generation in the
introductory section then nature’s residual generating mechanism implies that there is a
minimum (and perhaps a maximum) amount of residual associated with every level of
wood and chemical used by the firm, and that this minimum amount will increase as more
and more of these inputs are used. A restriction of such a technology in the space of
chemicals and the residual is shown in Figure 1(c). Clearly, the technology must violate
both output free-disposability of emission and input free-disposability of chemicals. But
T in (2.2) satisfies standard disposability assumptions with respect to paper and all its
inputs (see Figure 1(b)). Thus, (2.2) may not be an appropriate specification of even the
reduced-form technology underlying this example.
3. By-production and a necessary and sufficient characterization of technolo-
gies satisfying by-production.
3.1. A definition of by-production (BP) and properties of technologies satisfying (BP).
In this section we define the concept of by-production and show that technologies
that satisfy by-production have all the observed properties mentioned in the introductory
section.
First, we define three important projections of any observed emission generating tech-
nology T : (i) its projection into the space of all goods other than the emission– ΩT :=
{〈x, y, c〉 ∈ Rm+n+1| 〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ T for some z ≥ 0}, (ii) for all j = 1, . . . ,m, its projec-
tion into the space of all goods other than the jth intended output– ΞjT := {〈x, y−j , c, z〉 ∈
Rm+n+1| 〈x, y−j , yj , c, z〉 ∈ T for some yj ≥ 0}, and (iii) for all j = 1, . . . ,m, its pro-
jection into the space of all goods other than the jth intended output and the emission–
ΘjT := {〈x, y−j , c〉 ∈ Rn+m+ | 〈x, y−j , yj , c, z〉 ∈ T for some 〈z, yj〉 ∈ R2+}. These pro-
jections form the domains of the following mappings associated with T :18 the functions
18 Explicit specification of these projections is important as our examples in the next section demonstrate
that these sets may be quite restricted and have structures that are different from the ones that are usually
assumed in the case of non-emission generating technologies, namely, the entire non-negative orthants of
associated Euclidean spaces.
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g : ΩT → R+, g¯ : ΩT → R+ ∪ {∞}, and f j : ΞjT → R+ ∪ {∞} for all j = 1, . . . ,m with
images19
g(x, y, c) := inf {z ≥ 0| z ∈ PT (x, y, c)}, (3.1)
f j(x, z, c, y−j) := sup {yj ≥ 0| yj ∈ PT (x, y−j , c, z)}, if PT (x, y−j , c, z) is bounded and
:=∞, otherwise,
(3.2)
g¯(x, y, c) := sup {z ≥ 0| z ∈ PT (x, y, c)}, if PT (x, y, c) is bounded and
:=∞, otherwise, (3.3)
and the restriction mapping PT : Θ
j
T 7→ R2+ with image PT (x, y−j , c).
The functions g() and g¯() specify the minimum and maximum bounds on the level of
emission a firm with technology T can generate given fixed levels of all (including emission
generating) inputs, intended outputs, and its cleaning-up effort.20 The function f j()
specifies the maximum amount of the jth intended output that it can produce given fixed
levels of all other intended outputs, inputs, emission, and cleaning-up effort. Given the
domains of these functions, the constraint sets of the optimization problems defining these
functions are non-empty. The following provides a definition of an emission generating
technology.
Definition: T satisfies by-production (BP) if
(i) T is closed,
(ii) for all j = 1, . . . ,m and for all 〈x, y−j , c, z〉 ∈ ΞjT , the set PT (x, y−j , c, z) is bounded,
(iii) for all 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT , we have g(x, y, c) > 0 only if 〈x1, y1〉 6= 0 and there exists
〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT such that g(x, y, c) > 0,
(iv) for all 〈x, y, c〉 and 〈x¯, y¯, c¯〉 ∈ ΩT , we have
(a) g(x, y, c) ≥ g(x¯, y¯, c¯) if x1 ≥ x¯1, y1 ≥ y¯1, and c ≤ c¯. There exist 〈x, y, c〉 and
〈x¯, y¯, c¯〉 ∈ ΩT such that 〈x1, y1, c〉 6= 〈x¯1, y¯1, c¯〉, x1 ≥ x¯1, y1 ≥ y¯1, c ≤ c¯, and
g(x, y, c) > g(x¯, y¯, c¯),
(b) g(x, y, c) 6= g(x¯, y¯, c¯) only if 〈x1, y1, c〉 6= 〈x¯1, y¯1, c¯〉,
(c) g¯(x, y, c) 6= g¯(x¯, y¯, c¯) only if 〈x1, y1, c〉 6= 〈x¯1, y¯1, c¯〉,
(v) for all j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m and for all 〈x, y−j , c, z〉 and 〈x¯, y¯−j , c¯, z¯〉 ∈ ΞjT , we have
(a) f j(x, y−j , c, z) ≥ f j(x¯, y¯−j , c¯, z¯) if x ≥ x¯, y−j ≤ y¯−j , and c ≤ c¯, and
(b) f j(x, y−j , c, z) 6= f j(x¯, y¯−j , c¯, z¯) only if 〈x, y−j , c〉 6= 〈x¯, y¯−j , c¯〉.
19 A function f c(), similar to f j(), can also be defined for cleaning-up effort of the firm and the definition
of by-production below can be extended to include properties with respect to cleaning-up effort as well.
Here, in the interest of economizing on notation, we ignore this aspect. Nothing qualitatively substantive
is lost by this omission in this analysis.
20 Burning a given amount of coal always results in a certain minimum amount of smoke. Technical
inefficiency may generate more smoke than the minimum possible, but it is reasonable to assume that
there is also a bound on the maximum smoke that can be emitted with the fixed amount of coal.
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(i) and (ii) in the definition of (BP) ensure that, for any j, f j() is well-defined. Hence,
there exists a maximum amount of intended output j for every vector of inputs, cleaning-
up effort, intended outputs other than j, and emission. (iii) implies that the emission is
generated by the firm only because it employs inputs x1 and outputs y1. The other inputs
and intended outputs are not emission generating. (i) and (iii) also imply that g() is well
defined and that T is non-trivially an emission generating technology, i.e., there is a level
of its operation where it emits positive amount of the emission. (iv) captures the expected
monotonicity properties of function g(). Part (a) of (iv) implies that the minimum level
of emission increases if the firm employs more and more of the emission producing inputs
or produces more and more of the emission producing outputs or decreases its cleaning-up
effort. Parts (b) and (c) of (iv) imply that the minimum and maximum level of emission
depend only on x1, y1, and c and are unaffected by changes in inputs x2 and intended
outputs y2. Part (a) of (v) captures the expected monotonicity properties of function f j(),
where j is a non-emission generating intended output: The maximum amount of intended
output j is non-decreasing in all inputs, non-increasing in the remaining intended outputs
and cleaning-up efforts. Part (b) of (v) says that if all inputs, cleaning-up effort, and other
intended outputs are held fixed, then the maximum amount of output j is unaffected by
the level of emissions.21
For all j = 1, . . . ,m, define the correspondences P j : ΘjT 7→ R2+ and P¯ j : ΘjT 7→ R2+
with images
P j(x, y−j , c) = {〈z, yj〉 ∈ PT (x, y−j , c)| yj = f j(x, y−j , c, z) ∧ z = g(x, y−j , yj , c)}
P¯ j(x, y−j , c) = {〈z, yj〉 ∈ PT (x, y−j , c)| yj = f j(x, y−j , c, z) ∧ z = g¯(x, y−j , yj , c)}.
(3.4)
The correspondence P j() identifies the menu of efficient combinations of the emission
and the jth intended output for given levels of all inputs, remaining intended outputs,
and cleaning-up effort.22 Theorem 1 demonstrates that for technologies that satisfy (BP)
this correspondence is single-valued–there is only one minimum level of the emission and
one maximum level of the non-emission causing intended output j, when all resources
and all other outputs are held fixed. (Contrast this with the example in Section 2.)
This theorem also demonstrates a positive correlation between the emission and any non-
emission generating intended output when some inputs are the cause of the emission and
a negative correlation between the emission and any non-emission generating intended
output when some intended outputs are the cause of the emission.
21 Thus, a firm’s emission does not impose external effects on its own intended production activities.
This is a common implicit assumption in most empirical works in the literature (see, e.g., references in
Footnote 10) that involve a firm-level analysis. We will consider a weaker assumption later, which allows
such externalities.
22 Similarly, we can interpret the correspondence P¯ j().
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Theorem 1: Suppose m1 < m and T ⊂ Rn+m+2+ satisfies (BP). Then, for all j =
m1 + 1, . . . ,m,
(1.) the correspondences P j() and P¯ j() are single-valued (functions) and
(2.) if 〈z, yj〉 ∈ P j(x1, x2, y1, y2−j , c) and 〈z¯, y¯j〉 ∈ P j(x¯1, x2, y¯1, y2−j , c¯) then
(a) z ≥ z¯ and yj ≥ y¯j whenever x¯1 ≤ x1, c¯ ≥ c, and y1 = y¯1 and
(b) z ≥ z¯ and yj ≤ y¯j whenever x¯1 = x1, c¯ = c, and y1 ≥ y¯1.
Input and output free disposability are defined in a standard way:
Definition: T satisfies input free disposability (IFD) if 〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ T and x¯ ≥ x implies
〈x¯, y, c, z〉 ∈ T .
Definition: T satisfies output free disposability (OFD) if 〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ T and 〈y¯, c¯〉 ≤ 〈y, c〉
implies 〈x, y¯, c¯, z〉 ∈ T .
Theorem 2 shows that if T satisfies (BP) then it violates (IFD) and (OFD). T violates
free disposability of the emission causing inputs and cleaning-up effort of the firm. This is
because g() provides the lower bound on the emission and this function is non-decreasing
in the emission causing inputs and non-increasing in the cleaning-up effort of the firm.23 If
the upper bound on emissions g¯ is also increasing in the emission causing intended outputs,
then free-disposability of these outputs is also violated.
Theorem 2: Suppose T ⊂ Rn+m+2+ satisfies (BP) and
(1) m1 = 0 or
(2) there exist 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT and 〈x, y¯1, y2, c〉 ∈ ΩT such that y¯1 ≤ y1, y¯1 6= y1, and
g¯(x, y, c) > g¯(x, y¯1, y2, c).
Then T does not satisfy (OFD) and (IFD).
While (BP) is inconsistent with free disposability of goods that affect emission gener-
ation, we could still assume standard free disposability in the non-emission causing goods.
In particular, we define
Definition: T satisfies restricted output free disposability (ROFD) if 〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ T and
y¯2 ≤ y2 implies 〈x, y1, y¯2, c, z〉 ∈ T .24
We also define costly disposability of emissions as the case where all convex combi-
nations of the upper and the lower bounds on emissions are also technologically feasible.
Definition: T satisfies costly disposability of by-product (CDB) if 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT implies
g(x, y, c) < g¯(x, y, c) and 〈x, y, c, λg(x, y, c) + (1− λ)g¯(x, y, c)〉 ∈ T for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
23 Recall Figure 1(c).
24 Similarly we can define restricted input free disposability (RIFD).
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Define the graphs of the functions g() and f j() for all j = 1, . . . ,m:
GT :=
{〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ T | z = g(x, y, c)}
F jT :=
{〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ T | yj = f j(x, y−j , c, z)} . (3.5)
Theorem 3 shows that if T satisfies (BP) and (ROFD) or (CDB) then the graphs of the
functions g() and f j() for any non-emission generating intended output j are not identical,
i.e., these functions are not inverses of another and provide distinct information regarding
the production relations that define T . Contrast this with the example in Section 2,
where g(x1, x2, y) = y∏5
i=1 x
1
5
i
is the inverse of the production function fy in (2.1). On the
other hand Theorem 3 also shows that the functions f j are inverses of one another for
all the non-emission causing intended outputs j.25 Thus, all such functions f j provide
the same information about T .26 Theorem 5 in the next section will provide a functional
representation of T employing the two distinct relations underlying g() and f j() for any
j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m.
Theorem 3: Suppose T ⊂ Rn+m+2+ satisfies (BP) and m1 < m.
(1) If T also satisfies (CDB) then, for all j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m, we have GT 6= F jT .
(2) If T also satisfies (ROFD) then, for all j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m, we have GT 6= F jT .
(3) For all j, j′ = m1 + 1, . . . ,m such that j 6= j′ either F jT = F j
′
T or if there exist
〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ T such that yj = f j(x, y−j,j′ , yj′ , c, z) but yj′ 6= f j(x, y−j,j
′
, yj , c, z) =: y˜j′
then yj = f
j(x, y−j,j
′
, y˜j′ , c, z).
3.2. A necessary and sufficient characterization of technologies satisfying by-production.
By-products such as emissions are outputs of firms, whose production is governed by
certain laws of nature. From the point of view of these natural laws, the inputs required to
produce the by-product z are x1, y1, and c. In fact, the cleaning-up efforts c of firms are
unproductive (bad) inputs of by-product generation. On the other hand, from the point of
view of intended production, y1, y2, and c are outputs and x1 and x2 are inputs. Further,
if we allow for external effects that a firm’s emission z can impose on the production of its
own intended outputs, then z is also an input into intended production.27 Moreover, while
inputs x exhibit rivalness in the production of y and c,28 they jointly produce intended
25 Precisely, this result holds if we exclude the weakly efficient portions of T from our consideration.
26 With respect to the non-emission generating outputs, T shows properties similar to standard multiple-
output non-emission generating technologies.
27 If it imposes a negative external effect, then it is an unproductive or a bad input used in the production
of y and c.
28 i.e., a given level x of inputs is shared between the productions of various intended outputs and
cleaning-up effort
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outputs and the by-product.29 Similarly, the use of intended outputs y1 as inputs in the
production of z does not reduce the marketable amounts of these intended outputs.
The properties of technology T defined in the empirically observed space Rn+m+2+ of
goods are a result of all the above different roles that goods y, x, c, and z play in both
intended production and by-product generation. In this section we will disentangle and
delineate all these different roles by describing technological relations in a larger space of
commodities.30 By doing so, we will obtain another characterization of a technology T
that satisfies (BP) in the empirically observed space Rn+m+2+ .
z+ ∈ R+ will denote the amount of by-product (incidental output) that is produced
by a firm and z− ∈ R+ will denote the role of the by-product produced by the firm in
generating external effects on the production of the intended outputs. y+ ∈ Rm+ will
denote the vector of intended outputs produced by the firm, while y− ∈ Rm+ will denote
the vector of intended outputs that go in as inputs in the process of generation of the
by-product z+ in nature. x ∈ Rn will denote the role of the associated goods as inputs in
both intended production and by-production. c+ ∈ R+ is the cleaning-up effort produced
in intended production and c− ∈ R+ is the input of cleaning-up effort used to mitigate
the by-product. We now define two types of technologies in an extended commodity space
R
n+2(m+2)
+ .
The first type, called an intended production technology (IPT), will be denoted by
T1 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ . It is concerned only with the roles as outputs of the goods denoted
by y and c, the roles as inputs of the goods denoted by x, and the role of z as an in-
put.31 Thus, it contains vectors of the form 〈x, y+, y−, c+, c−, z+, z−〉 ∈ Rn+2(m+2)+ with
z+ = 0, c− = 0, and y− = 0. We define the following sets induced by this technology:
ΩT1 := {〈x, y+, c+〉 ∈ Rn+m+1+ | 〈x, y+, 0, c+, 0, 0, z−〉 ∈ T1 for some z− ∈ R+}, ΞjT1 :=
{〈x, y−j+, c+, z−〉 ∈ Rn+m+1+ | 〈x, y−j+, yj+, 0, c+, 0, 0, z−〉 ∈ T1 for some yj+ ∈ R+},
ΘjT1 := {〈x, y
−j
+ , c+〉 ∈ Rn+m| 〈x, y−j+ , yj+, 0, c+, 0, 0, z−〉 ∈ T1 for some 〈yj , z〉 ∈ R2+}
for j = 1, . . . ,m. In an obvious way, we can also define various restrictions of T1 such as
PT1(x, y+, c+), PT1(x, y−j+, c+, z−), and PT1(x, y−j+, c+) for j = 1, . . . ,m.32
The second type, called a by-product generating technology (BPT), will be denoted
by T2 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ . It is concerned only with the roles of the goods denoted by y and c
as inputs, the roles of the goods denoted by x as inputs, and the role of z as an output of
production.33 Thus, it contains vectors of the form 〈x, y+, y−, c+, c−, z+, z−〉 ∈ Rn+2(m+2)+
with z− = 0, c+ = 0, and y+ = 0. In an obvious manner, we define the sets ΩT2 , Ξ
j
T2 ,
29 i.e., if generation of the by-product requires a certain level of x1, then it does not reduce the amount
of x1 left to be shared between the production of y and c.
30 Not dissimilar to commodity spaces found in Milleron [1972] in the context of public goods.
31 Note, these are the roles that these goods assume in intended production activities of firms.
32 For example, PT1(x, y+, c+) = {z− ∈ R+| 〈x, y+, 0, c+, 0, 0, z−〉 ∈ T1}.
33 Note, these are the roles that these goods assume in nature’s by-product generation mechanism.
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and ΘjT2 for j = 1, . . . ,m and also restrictions PT2(x, y−, c−), PT2(x, y
−j−, c−, z+), and
PT2(x, y−j−, c−).34
As in the case of technologies defined in the empirically observed space Rn+m+2+ , we
define functions that specify the bounds on intended outputs and levels of the externality
that are consistent with T1 holding all other goods fixed: GT1 : ΩT1 → R+, G¯T1 : ΩT1 →
R+ ∪ {∞}, and F jT1 : Ξ
j
T1 → R+ ∪ {∞} for all j = 1, . . . ,m with images
GT1(x, y+, c+) := inf {z− ≥ 0| z− ∈ PT1(x, y+, c+)}, (3.6)
F jT1(x, y−j+, c+, z−) := sup {yj+ ≥ 0| yj+ ∈ PT1(x, y−j+, c+, z−)},
if PT1(x, y−j+, c+, z−) is bounded and
:=∞, otherwise.
(3.7)
and
G¯T1(x, y+, c+) := sup {z− ≥ 0| z− ∈ PT (x, y+, c+)},
if PT1(x, y+, c+) is bounded and
:=∞, otherwise.
(3.8)
Similarly too, we can define functions: GT2 : ΩT2 → R+, G¯T2 : ΩT2 → R+ ∪
{∞}, and F jT2 : Ξ
j
T2 → R+ ∪ {∞} for all j = 1, . . . ,m with images GT2(x, y−, c−),
F jT2(x, y−j−, c−, z+), and G¯T2(x, y−, c−).
The properties of an IPT are summarized in the definition below. They include
standard assumptions of boundedness of intended outputs and free disposability of inputs
and outputs that are normally imposed on non-emission generating technologies (qualified
only by external effects of z on intended production).
Definition: T1 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ is an intended production technology (IPT) if
(i) T1 is closed and 〈x, y+, y−, c+, c−, z+, z−〉 ∈ T1 implies that z+ = 0, c− = 0, and
y− = 0,
(ii) for all j = 1, . . . ,m, PT1(x, y
−j
+ , c+, z−) is bounded for all 〈x, y−j+ , c+, z−〉 ∈ ΞjT1 , and
(iii) for all j = 1, . . . ,m and for all 〈x, y−j+ , c+, z−〉, 〈x¯, y¯−j+ , c¯+, z−〉 ∈ ΞjT1 , we have
PT1(x, y
−j
+ , c+, z−) ⊆ PT1(x¯, y¯−j+ , c¯+, z−) if x¯ ≥ x, y¯−j+ ≤ y−j+ , and c¯+ ≤ c+.35
From the definition of an IPT, the following obvious remark regarding the monotonic-
ity properties of function F j with respect to inputs and outputs of intended production
34 For example, ΩT2 := {〈x, y−, c−〉 ∈ Rn+m+1+ | 〈x, 0, y−, 0, c−, 0z+, 0〉 ∈ T2 for some z+ ∈ R+} and
PT1(x, y
−j
−, c−, z+) = {yj− ∈ R+| 〈x, 0, y−j− , yj−, 0, c−, z+, 0〉 ∈ T2}.
35 This is equivalent to T1 satisfying free disposability of all inputs, intended outputs, and abatement
output.
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(excluding the externality z−) follow, namely, F j is non-decreasing in x and non-increasing
in y−j+ and c+.36
Remark 1: Let T1 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ be an IPT. For all j = 1, . . . ,m and for all 〈x, y−j+, c+, z−〉,
〈x¯, y¯−j+ , c¯+, z−〉 ∈ ΞT1 , (iii) in the definition of an IPT implies
(a) F jT1(x, y−j+, c+, z−) ≥ F
j
T1(x¯, y¯
−j
+ , c¯+, z−) if x¯ ≤ x, y¯−j+ ≥ y−j+, and c¯+ ≥ c+ and
(b) F jT1(x, y−j+, c+, z−) > F
j
T1(x¯, y¯
−j
+ , c¯+, z−) only if 〈x¯, y¯−j+ , c¯+〉 6= 〈x, y−j+, c+〉 and it
is not the case that x¯ ≥ x, y¯−j+ ≤ y−j+ , and c¯+ ≤ c+.
The properties of a BPT are summarized in the definition below. They specify the
laws of nature regarding by-product generation. They are similar to (CDB) and properties
(iii) and (iv) that were assumed in the definition of (BP) in the empirically observed
commodity space.37
Definition: T2 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ is nature’s by-product producing technology (BPT) if
(i) T2 is closed and 〈x, y+, y−, c+, c−, z+, z−〉 ∈ T2 implies that z− = 0, c+ = 0, and
y+ = 0,
(ii) GT2(x, y−, c−) > 0 implies 〈x1, y1−, c−〉 6= 0 and there exists 〈x, y−, c−〉 ∈ ΩT2 such
that GT2(x, y−, c−) > 0,
(iii) z+ = λGT2(x, y−, c−) + (1− λ)G¯T2(x, y−, c−) ∈ PT2(x, y−, c−) for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and for
every 〈x, y−, c−〉 ∈ ΩT2 , and
(iv) for all 〈x1, x2, y1−, y2−, c−〉 ∈ ΩT2 and 〈x¯1, x¯2, y¯1−, y¯2−, c¯−〉 ∈ ΩT2 , we have
(a) GT2(x1, x2, y1−, y2−, c−) ≥ GT2(x¯1, x¯2, y¯1−, y¯2−, c¯−) if y¯1− ≤ y1−, x¯1 ≤ x1, and c¯− ≥ c−
and there exist 〈x1, x2, y1−, y2−, c−〉 ∈ ΩT2 and 〈x¯1, x¯2, y¯1−, y¯2−, c¯−〉 ∈ ΩT2 such that
〈x¯1, y¯1−, c¯−〉 6= 〈x1, y1−, c−〉, y¯1− ≤ y1−, x¯1 ≤ x1, c¯− ≥ c−, and GT2(x1, x2, y1−, y2−, c−) >
GT2(x¯1, x¯2, y¯1−, y¯2−, c¯−),
(b) GT2(x1, x2, y1−, y2−, c−) 6= GT2(x¯1, x¯2, y¯1−, y¯2−, c¯−) only if 〈x¯1, y¯1−, c¯−〉 6= 〈x1, y1−, c−〉,
and
36 The monotonicity properties with respect to z− depends on the nature of externalities that it generates
in intended production.
37 Environmental resources such as air and water are inputs of nature’s emission generating mechanism,
so they should form a part of the BPT. Moreover, such resources are non-subsitutable inputs in emission
generation. An example of a production relation that incorporates a natural resource, denoted by r ∈ R+,
as a non-substitutable input of the BPT is
z+ ≥ min{GT2(x, y−, c−), φr}, (3.9)
where φ > 0 is the assimilative capacity of the natural resource to absorb one unit of the emission. Though
in our model, we abstract from including r, the demand for this input is immediately determined from
(3.9) once the level of emission is known.
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(c) G¯T2(x1, x2, y1−, y2−, c−) 6= G¯T2(x¯1, x¯2, y¯1−, y¯2−, c¯−) only if 〈x¯1, y¯1−, c¯−〉 6= 〈x1, y1−, c−〉.38
Given any IPT T1 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ and BPT T2 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ we can derive a technology
T (T1, T2) in the empirically observed space Rn+m+2+ from them:39
T (T1, T2) :=
{〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ Rn+m+2+ | 〈x, y, 0, c, 0, 0, z〉 ∈ T1 ∧ 〈x, 0, y, 0, c, z, 0〉 ∈ T2}.
(3.10)
It is easy to derive the relevant projections for the technology T (T1, T2). These inherit
their structures from both the IPT and BPT underlying T (T1, T2).
ΩT (T1,T2) = {〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT1 ∩ ΩT2 | PT1(x, y, c) ∩ PT2(x, y, c) 6= ∅}, (3.11)
Ξj
T (T1,T2) = {〈x, y
−j , c, z〉 ∈ ΞjT1 ∩ Ξ
j
T2 | PT1(x, y−j , c, z) ∩ PT2(x, y−j , c, z) 6= ∅}, (3.12)
and
Θj
T (T1,T2) = {〈x, y
−j , c〉 ∈ ΘjT1 ∩Θ
j
T2| PT1(x, y−j , c) ∩ PT2(x, y−j , c) 6= ∅} (3.13)
for all j = 1, . . . ,m. In that case, for all 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT (T1,T2), for all j = 1, . . . ,m, and for
all 〈x, y−j , c, z〉 ∈ Ξj
T (T1,T2), we have
g(x, y, c) = min{z ∈ R+| z ∈ PT (T1,T2)(x, y, c)}
= min{z ∈ R+| z ∈ PT1(x, y, c) ∩ PT2(x, y, c)},
g¯(x, y, c) = max{z ∈ R+| z ∈ PT (T1,T2)(x, y, c)}
= max{z ∈ R+| z ∈ PT1(x, y, c) ∩ PT2(x, y, c)}, and
f j(x, y−j , c, z) = max{yj ∈ R+| yj ∈ PT (T1,T2)(x, y−j , c, z)}
= max{yj ∈ R+| yj ∈ PT1(x, y−j , c, z) ∩ PT2(x, y−j , c, z)}.
(3.14)
(3.14) suggests that the functions g(), g¯, and f j() inherit their properties from both the
IPT T1 and the BPT T2.40
Theorem 4 provides a sufficient characterization of a technology satisfying (BP) in
the observed space Rn+m+2+ .
41 If the production relation underlying an IPT (T1) is inde-
pendent of external effects generated by the by-product z then, given that the production
relation underlying a BPT (T2) is independent of goods x2 and y2, we find that the tech-
nology T (T1, T2) in the observed commodity space Rn+m+2+ satisfies (BP).
38 Recall, the minimum and maximum amount of by-product is not affected by y2 and x2 given our
primitive assumptions.
39 Having distinguished between an IPT and BPT in terms of the roles played by different goods in
intended production and the production of by-products, we conveniently, and without confusion, ignore
all the subscripts + and − that were employed earlier in this section.
40 The next section provides some examples to illustrate this.
41 It is a formalization of the results in Murty and Russell [2010].
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Theorem 4: Let T1 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ be an IPT and T2 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ be a BPT and define
T := T (T1, T2). Suppose the following hold:
(a) for all j = 1, . . . ,m and for all 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT1, we have
PT1(x, y, c) = R+ (3.15)
and
(b) for all 〈x1, y1, c, z〉 ∈ Rn1+m1+2 such that PT2(x1, y1−, c−, z+) 6= ∅, we have
PT2(x
1, y1, c, z) = Rn2+m2+ . (3.16)
Then T satisfies (BP), (CDB), (RIFD), and (ROFD).
If T ⊂ Rn+m+2+ satisfies (BP) then it follows that, for any j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m, the
function f j() will be invariant to changes in z and the functions g() and g¯() will be invariant
to changes in yj . In that case, it follows from Theorem 1 that, for all j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m,
there exist functions ρj : ΘjT → R+, σj : ΘjT → R+, and σ¯j : ΘjT → R+ such that
P j(x, y−j , c) = 〈ρj(x, y−j , c), σj(x, y−j , c)〉 and
P¯ j(x, y−j , c) = 〈ρj(x, y−j , c), σ¯j(x, y−j , c)〉.
(3.17)
In Theorem 5, conclusions of Theorem 1 are employed, firstly, to obtain a functional
representation of a technology T that satisfies (BP) in the empirically observed space
Rn+m+2+ and, secondly, to construct an IPT (T1), which is independent of z, and a BPT
(T2), which is independent of y2 and x2, such that T = T (T1, T2). This will demonstrate
that the sufficient characterization in Theorem 4 of a technology satisfying (BP) in the
observed space of commodities is also necessary.
Theorem 5: If T ⊂ Rn+m+2+ satisfies (BP), (ROFD), and (CDB) then,
(1) given any j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m, T can be functionally represented by
T :=
{〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ Rn+m+2+ | 〈x, y−j , c〉 ∈ ΘjT ∧ yj ≤ ρj(x, y−j , c)
∧ σ¯j(x, y−j , c) ≥ z ≥ σj(x, y−j , c)} and (3.18)
(2) there exist an IPT T1 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ satisfying Assumption (a) of Theorem 4 and a
BPT T2 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ satisfying Assumption (b) of Theorem 4 such that T = T (T1, T2).
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We now provide a weaker definition of technologies that generate emissions than
(BP). All that is required by this definition is that there exist some intended outputs or
inputs of a firm that can generate an emission, a positive amount of emission is actually
observed at some combination of intended outputs and inputs, and that there are maximal
and minimal bounds on emission generation and the production of intended outputs. No
restrictions of monotonicity are placed on the various bounds on T ∈ Rn+m+2+ .
Definition: T ∈ Rn+m+2+ satisfies weak by-production (WBP) if
(i) T is closed,
(ii) for all j = 1, . . . ,m and for all 〈x, y−j , c, z〉 ∈ ΞjT , the set P (x, y−j , c, z) is bounded,
and
(iii) there exists 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT such that g(x, y, c) > 0.
Theorem 6 shows that, in general, combining any IPT in the extended commodity
space with any BPT ensures only that the resulting technology in the empirically observed
space satisfies (WBP). Bounds of the observed technology may violate the monotonicity
properties in the definition of (BP) if the underlying IPT is not independent of external
effects of the emission.42 Employing the bounds of the underlying IPT and the BPT, it
also provides a functional representation of the derived observed technology in Rn+m+2+ .
Theorem 6: Let T1 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ be an IPT and T2 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ be a BPT. Suppose
the following hold:
(a) there exists 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT (T1∩T2) such that GT2(x, y, c) > 0 and
(b) for all 〈x1, y1, c, z〉 ∈ Rn1+m1+2 such that PT2(x1, y1, c, z) 6= ∅, we have
PT2(x
1, y1, c, z) = Rn2+m2+ . (3.19)
Then T (T1, T2) satisfies (WBP), (RIFD), and (ROFD) and, given any j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m,
T (T1, T2) can functionally be represented by43
T (T1, T2) =
{〈x, y,c, z〉 ∈ Rn+m+2+ | 〈x, y−j , c, z〉 ∈ ΞjT1 ∧ 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT2
∧ yj ≤ F jT1(x, y−j , c, z)
∧ min{G¯T1(x, y, c), G¯T2(x, y, c)} ≥ z ≥ max{GT1(x, y, c),GT2(x, y, c)}
}
.
(3.20)
42 Examples 3 and 4 in the next section demonstrate this.
43 〈x, y−j , c, z〉 ∈ ΞjT1 and yj ≤ F
j
T1(x, y
−j , c, z) imply that 〈x, y, 0, c, 0, 0, z〉 ∈ T1. Hence, 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT1
and GT1(x, y, c) and G¯T1(x, y, c) are well-defined. 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT2 and min{G¯T1(x, y, c), G¯T2(x, y, c)} ≥ z ≥
max{GT1(x, y, c),GT2(x, y, c)} imply that 〈x, 0, y, 0, c, z, 0〉 ∈ T2.
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Corollary to Theorem 6: If all conditions of Theorem 4 hold then, given any j =
m1 + 1, . . . ,m, T can be functionally represented by
T = {〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ Rn+m+2+ | 〈x, y−j , c, z〉 ∈ ΞjT1 ∧ 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT2 ∧
yj ≤ F jT1(x, y−j , c, z) ∧ GT2(x, y, c) ≤ z ≤ G¯T2(x, y, c)}.
(3.21)
4. Examples of by-production.
In this section, we study four examples to illustrate the by-production approach to mod-
eling emission generating technologies. Each example specifies a particular pair of IPT
and BPT, from which a technology in the space of the observed variables is derived and its
properties are studied. The first two examples lead to observed technologies that satisfies
(BP), while the last two examples lead to observed technologies that satisfy (WBP). In
the first example, some inputs are the cause of the emission, while in the second case, an
intended output is the cause of the emission. The third and fourth examples consider pairs
of IPT and BPT, where the emissions also impose (negative and positive) external effects
on the IPT. All our results of the previous section are illustrated through these examples.
The projections and restrictions of the technologies in the observed spaces that are derived
from various pairs of IPT and BPT as well as the various bounds on them exhibit non-
standard structures. This is because they inherit features from both the IPTs and BPTs
associated with them. In particular, standard disposability properties are violated by those
goods that affect both intended production and nature’s emission generation. When an
emission of a firm also impose externalities on its intended production then, contrary to
conclusions of Theorem 1, for given levels of all inputs, there may exist a considerable
menu of efficient combinations of the emission and intended outputs.
4.1. Example 1 (paper production): Inputs as sources of emission and no emission-
externality on intended production.
The example of paper production in Section 2 is considered again. Cleaning-up effort of the
firm is also explicitly modeled. Here, n = 5, n1 = 2, n2 = 3, m = 1, and m1 = 0. Suppose
the intended production technology and the nature’s by-product generating technology
have the following forms:
T1 = {〈x1, x2, y, 0, c, 0, 0, z〉 ∈ R11+ | y ≤
5∏
i=1
xvii − c} and
T2 = {〈x1, x2, 0, y, 0, c, z, 0〉 ∈ R11+ | γ +
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc ≥ z ≥
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc},
(4.1)
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where vi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , 5,
∑5
i=1 vi ≤ 1, αi > 0 for all i = 1, 2, β > 0, and γ > 0.
It is easy to check that T1 and T2 in (4.1) satisfy the definitions of an IPT and a BPT,
respectively. Let us consider various projections and restrictions of the IPT and BPT:
ΩT1 = {〈x, y, c〉 ∈ R7+| y ≤
5∏
i=1
xvii − c} and
PT1(x, y, c) = R+ ∀ 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT1 ,
ΞyT1 = {〈x, z, c〉 ∈ R7+|
5∏
i=1
xvii − c ≥ 0} and
PT1(x, z, c) = {y ∈ R+| y ≤
5∏
i=1
xvii − c} ∀ 〈x, z, c〉 ∈ ΞyT1 .
(4.2)
The structure of PT1(x, z, c) in (4.2) demonstrate that, from the point of view of intended
production, paper production is unaffected by the presence of chemical residuals. In ad-
dition, the structure of PT1(x, y, c) demonstrates that Assumption (a) of Theorem 4 holds
for this example. Thus, in this example, T1 is independent of generation of emissions.
Some of the projections and restrictions induced by T2 are
ΩT2 = {〈x, y, c〉 ∈ R5+|
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc ≥ −γ} and
PT2(x, y, c) = {z ∈ R+| γ +
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc ≥ z ≥
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc} ∀ 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT2 ,
ΞyT2 = {〈x, z, c〉 ∈ R5+| γ +
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc ≥ z ≥
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc} and
PT2(x, z, c) = R+ ∀ 〈x, z, c〉 ∈ ΞyT2 .
(4.3)
The structure of PT2(x, z, c) in (4.3) demonstrates that nature’s by-product generating
technology is, ceteris paribus, unaffected by the output of paper. The structure of PT2(x, z, c)
in (4.3) shows that Assumption (b) of Theorem 4 also holds for this example. Thus, in
this example, the BPT is independent of the level of the intended output.
Denote the observed technology obtained from the pair of IPT and BPT in (4.1) by
T := T (T1, T2) ⊂ R8+. For this observed technology, note that for all 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT1 ∩ΩT2 ,
(4.2) and (4.3) imply that PT1(x, y, c) ∩ PT2(x, y, c) = PT2(x, y, c). Hence, (3.13) implies
that
ΩT = ΩT2 and PT (x, y, c) = PT2(x, y, c), (4.4)
i.e., the observed technology T inherits its projection ΩT and restriction PT (x, y, c) from
the BPT of (4.1). On the other hand, it can be shown that (4.2) and (4.3) also imply that
it inherits its projection ΞyT and restriction PT (x, c, z) from the IPT of (4.1):
ΞyT = Ξ
y
T1 and PT (x, c, z) = PT1(x, c, z). (4.5)
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The function g : ΩT → R+ is obtained as
g(x, y, c) := min{z ∈ R+| z ∈ PT (x, y, c)} = min{z ∈ R+| z ∈ PT2(x, y, c)}
=
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc if
∑
i
αixi − βc ≥ 0 and
= 0 if − γ ≤
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc ≤ 0
(4.6)
Similarly, we obtain g¯ : ΩT → R+ with image
g¯(x, y, c) = γ +
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc. (4.7)
The function fy : ΞyT → R+ is obtained as
fy(x, z, c) := max{y ∈ R+| y ∈ PT (x, z, c)} = max{y ∈ R+| y ∈ PT1(x, z, c)}
=
5∏
i=1
xvii − c.
(4.8)
We now check the properties of T . Clearly the T is closed. For all 〈x, c, z〉 ∈ ΞyT ,
(4.2) implies that the set PT (x, c, z) = PT1(x, c, z) is bounded. For appropriately chosen
values of the parameters, it is not difficult to find a production vector 〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ T such
that g(x, y, c) > 0.44 Thus, T satisfies conditions (i) to (iii) in the definition of (BP).
The function g() is non-increasing in the extent of cleaning-up efforts of the firm and
non-decreasing in the levels of chemicals and wood used in intended production. Ceteris
paribus, it is unaffected by the output of paper y. This is because, according to the nature
defined BPT in this example, the residual generated is affected only by the use of chemical
and wood inputs and the cleaning-up efforts of the firm. Hence, so long as all inputs and
cleaning-up efforts are held fixed, an increase in paper production (which is still possible,
if there is technical inefficiency in paper production at this fixed level of inputs) has no
effect on residual generation.
The function fy() is increasing in the amounts of all inputs used by the firm and
decreasing in the amount of cleaning up efforts of the firm. Ceteris paribus, it is unaffected
by the level of residual generated–if all inputs and cleaning-up efforts are held fixed then
any change in residual generation (which is still possible if there are technical inefficiencies
in residual generation) has no effect on paper production. The properties of the functions
g(), g¯(), and fy() indicate that T also satisfies conditions (iv) and (v) in the definition of
(BP). Therefore, T satisfies (BP).
44 The production vector with y =
∏5
i=1 x
vi
i − c, xi > β
2
α2
i
for i = 1, 2, xi = 1 for i = 3, 4, 5, c =
∑2
i=1
β
αi
,
and z =
∑
i αixi − βc does the job when β
4v1v2
α21α
2
1
− βα1+α2 > 0.
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(4.4) and (4.5) imply that T satisfies (CDB) and (ROFD). It also satisfies free dispos-
ability in any non-residual generating input.45 But it violates free-disposability of c and
any emission-generating input. This is shown in Figures 2(a) and 2(b) where we draw
PT (x2, x4, x5, y, c, z) := PT1(x2, x4, x5, y, c, z) ∩ PT2(x2, x4, x5, y, c, z)
={〈x′1, x′3〉 ∈ R2+|
y + c∏
i6=1,3 x
vi
i
≤ x′1v1x′3v3 ∧
z + βc− α2x2 − γ
α1
≤ x′1 ≤
z + βc− α2x2
α1
} and
PT (x2, x3, x4, x5, y, z) := PT1(x2, x3, x4, x5, y, z) ∩ PT2(x2, x3, x4, x5, y, z)
={〈x′1, c′〉 ∈ R2+| c′ ≤
∏
i6=1
xvii x
′
1
v1 − y ∧ z + βc
′ − α2x2 − γ
α1
≤ x′1 ≤
z + βc′ − α2x2
α1
}.
(4.9)
It is clear from these figures that T satisfies input freely disposability in non-emission
generating x3, but violates input and output free disposability in x1 and c, respectively.
This is because x3 affects only the IPT, while x1 and c affect both IPT and BPT. While
IPT has standard free disposability properties in all inputs, y, and c and is independent
of z, BPT violates standard free disposability of x1, x2, c, and z. Thus, all conclusions of
Theorem 4 hold for this example.
T satisfies all assumptions of parts (1) and (2) of Theorem 3. (4.6) and (4.8) shows
that g() and fy() (which T inherits from the BPT and IPT, respecitively) are not inverses
of one another–their graphs are not identical. Thus conclusions of parts 1 and 2 of Theorem
3 hold for this example. Further, in this example, it can be shown that T inherits ΘyT from
both the IPT and BPT
ΘyT = Θ
y
T1 ∩Θ
y
T2 = {〈x, c〉 ∈ R2+|
5∏
i=1
xvii − c ≥ 0 ∧
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc ≥ −γ}. (4.10)
Figure 2(c) shows the restriction PT (x, c) ⊂ R2+ for 〈x, c〉 ∈ ΘyT .46 In the figure, z∗ =
g¯(x, c, y∗), z∗ = g(x, c, y∗), and y∗ = fy(x, c, z∗). In particular, we note that the corre-
spondence P y : ΘyT 7→ R2+ has image
P y(x, c) = 〈y, z〉 = 〈
5∏
i=1
xvii − c,
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc〉 if
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc ≥ 0
= 〈
5∏
i=1
xvii − c, 0〉 if − γ ≤
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc ≤ 0.
(4.11)
45 This is seen in Figure 2(c) that will be discussed later.
46 Note that this figure illustrates that T satisfies output free disposability with respect to y but there
is a lower bound for z. Hence, it violates output free disposability with respect to the by-product z. It
satisfies (CDB).
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Thus, it is single valued. It is clear (see also Figure 2(d)) that this correspondence is
non-increasing in c, non-decreasing in x1 and x2, and non-decreasing in x3, x4, and x5. In
the figure 〈y∗, z∗〉 = P y(x, c) and 〈y∼, z∼〉 = P y(x˜1, x2, c˜) with x˜1 > x1 and c˜ < c. This
demonstrates that conclusions of Theorem 1 hold for this example.
Noting that functions fy(), g(), and g¯() are independent of z, y, and y, respectively,
we can obtain a functional representation of T as in part 1 of Theorem 5:
T =
{〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ R8+| y ≤ 5∏
i=1
xvii − c ∧
γ +
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc ≥ z ≥
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc if
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc ≥ 0 ∧
γ +
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc ≥ z ≥ 0 if − γ ≤
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc ≤ 0
}
.
(4.12)
4.2. Example 2 (a dairy): An intended output as a source of emission and no emission
externality on intended production.
Consider the case of a dairy that uses milk (x) as an input to produce cheese (y1), butter
(y2), and cream (y3) as its intended outputs. The input milk itself is not a cause of any
emission, but a strong odor (an emission) emanates from its output of cheese. Thus,
n = 1, n2 = 1, m = 3, and m1 = 1. Suppose the intended production technology and the
by-product generating technology have the following forms:
T1 = {〈x, y1, y2, y3, 0, 0, 0, 0, z〉 ∈ R9+| y1 ≤ x
1
2 − y2 − y3} and
T2 = {〈x, 0, 0, 0, y1, y2, y3, z, 0〉 ∈ R9+| γ + αy1 ≥ z ≥ αy1}.
(4.13)
As in Example 1, it can be checked that in this example all the assumptions of Theorem 4
hold and so T := T (T1, T2) satisfies (BP). In particular, we find that, whenever the various
restrictions of T are non-empty, they take the following structures:
PT (x, y1, y2, y3) = {z ∈ R+| γ + αy1 ≥ z ≥ αy1},
PT (x, y2, y3, z) = {y1 ∈ R+| y1 ≤ x
1
2 − y2 − y3 ∧ z
α
≥ y1 ≥ z − γ
α
}, and
PT (x, y1, yj′ , z) = {yj ∈ R+| yj ≤ x
1
2 − y1 − yj′} ∀ j, j′ = 2, 3.
(4.14)
The structure of PT (x, y2, y3, z) demonstrates that T violates free disposability of cheese,
the output that causes the odor. However, for j, j′ = 2, 3, the structure of PT (x, y1, yj′ , z)
shows that T satisfies free disposability of outputs butter and cream and the input milk
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that do not cause the emission. Further, the structure of PT (x, y1, y2, y3) demonstrates
that T satisfies (CDB). It can be checked that, in this example,
g(x, y1, y2, y3) := αy1 = GT2(x, y1, y2, y3),
g¯(x, y1, y2, y3) := γ + αy1 = G¯T2(x, y1, y2, y3),
f1(x, y2, y3, z) = min {x
1
2 − y2 − y3, z
α
}, and
f j(x, y1, yj′ , z) = x
1
2 − y1 − yj′ = F jT1(x, y1, yj′ , z) ∀ j, j′ = 2, 3.
(4.15)
The function g (the minimum level of strong odor) inherits all its properties from GT2
of the BPT. It is increasing in cheese, the intended output causing the odor. However,
it is unaffected by the levels of butter and cream produced or the amount of milk used.
For any non-odorous output j, the function f j inherits all its properties from F jT1 . It is
increasing in the amount of the input milk used, it is decreasing in the levels of the other
two intended outputs, and it is unaffected by the odor itself. Note also that g() and f j()
are not inverses of one another. However, the two functions f2() and f3() are inverses of
one another. Thus, all conclusions of Theorem 3 hold for this example non-trivially. The
function f1 corresponding to the odorous output (cheese) inherits its properties from both
F1T1 and F1T2 . It is, ceteris paribus, non-decreasing in x, non-increasing in y2 and y3, and is
not independent of (it is non-decreasing in) z. Further, its graph is distinct from g(), g¯(),
f2(), and f3(). Thus, in this example too, more than one production relation is needed to
functionally represent the observed technology T (see Theorem 5):
T = {〈x, y1, y2, y3, z〉 ∈ R5+| y1 ≤ x
1
2 − y2 − y3 ∧ αy1 + γ ≥ z ≥ αy1}. (4.16)
4.3. Example 3 (a thermal power plant): An input as a source of emission and a negative
emission externality on intended production.
Consider the case of a thermal power plant that employs inputs of coal (x1) and
labor (x2) to produce electricity (y) and a by-product smoke (z). Thus, in this case
n = 2, n1 = 1, m = 1, andm1 = 0). Suppose emission z decreases the average productivity
of labor in intended production. Suppose the underlying IPT and BPT are
T1 = {〈x1, x2, y, 0, 0, z〉 ∈ R6+| y ≤ x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 − z} and
T2 = {〈x1, x2, 0, y, z, 0〉 ∈ R6+| γ + αx1 ≥ z ≥ αx1}.
(4.17)
T1 and T2 are valid IPT and BPT, respectively. We again focus on the structures of those
restrictions of the IPT and BPT that are non-empty.47 The fact that the smoke affects the
47 These correspond to points in the projections ΩT1 , ΩT2 , Ξ
y
T1 , and Ξ
y
T2 , which can be derived in a
straightforward way.
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intended production of electricity implies that Assumption (a) of Theorem 4 is violated in
this example:
PT1(x1, x2, y) = {z ∈ R+| z ≤ x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 − y} and
PT1(x1, x2, z) = {y ∈ R+| y ≤ x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 − z}.
(4.18)
(4.18) shows that the production of electricity is not independent of the level of smoke
produced. The restriction PT1(x1, x2, z) shrinks as z increases. However, the structure of
PT2(x1, x2, y) shows that the production of smoke is not (directly) affected by the level of
electricity produced (in nature, smoke is caused by the burning of coal):
PT2(x1, x2, y) = {z ∈ R+| γ + αx1 ≥ z ≥ αx1} and
PT2(x1, x2, z) = R+.
(4.19)
(4.19) demonstrates that Assumption (b) of Theorem 4 holds for this example. Define
T := T (T1, T2). We now study the properties of the observed technology T .
Note that, while in this example, ΘyT1 = R
2
+ = Θ
y
T2 , Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show that,
for any given 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ ΘyT1 ∩Θ
y
T2 ,
PT (x1, x2) = PT1(x1, x2) ∩ PT2(x1, x2)
= {〈z, y〉 ∈ R2+| y ≤ x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 − z ∧ γ + αx1 ≥ z ≥ αx1}
(4.20)
is non-empty-set if and only if x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 ≥ αx1. Hence, from (3.13) it follows that
ΘyT = {〈x1, x2〉 ∈ R2+| x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 ≥ αx1}. (4.21)
The functions g : ΩT → R+, g¯ : ΩT → R+, and fy : ΞyT → R+ are obtained as48
g(x1, x2, y) := min{z ∈ R+| z ∈ PT (x1, x2, y)}
= min{z ∈ R+| z ∈ PT1(x1, x2, y) ∩ PT2(x1, x2, y)}
= min{z ∈ R+| z ≤ x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 − y ∧ γ + αx1 ≥ z ≥ αx1} = αx1
g¯(x1, x2, y) = min{γ + αx1, x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 − y}
fy(x1, x2, z) := max{y ∈ R+| y ∈ PT (x1, x2, z)} = max{y ∈ R+| y ∈ PT1(x1, x2, z)}
= x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 − z.
(4.22)
Note that although, PT (x1, x2, y) inherits its structure from both the IPT and the BPT, g()
inherits its properties only from the BPT. This is because the lower bound on PT1(x1, x2, y)
is zero for all 〈x1, x2, y〉 ∈ ΩT1 . Thus, g() is increasing in the usage of the emission causing
48 Note, ΩT = {〈x1, x2, y〉 ∈ R3+| x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 ≥ αx1 ∧ y ≤ x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 −αx1} and ΞyT = {〈x1, x2, z〉 ∈ R3+| x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 ≥
αx1 ∧ γ + αx1 ≥ z ≥ αx1}.
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input of coal and it is independent of the level of electricity produced.49 g¯ inherits its
properties from both the underlying IPT and BPT. fy() inherits its property only from
the IPT, as y does not affect the nature’s BPT. fy() is increasing in both the inputs. But,
it is decreasing in z (see Figure 3(b)). This is because, in this example, smoke adversely
affects the intended production of electricity.50 Thus, T violates (v) in the definition of
(BP). Note, however, that it satisfies (i) to (iii) in the definition of (BP), hence, it satisfies
(WBP). Also, from (4.18) and (4.19) it follows that PT (x1, x2, z) = PT1(x1, x2, z) and
the structure of PT1(x1, x2, z) in (4.18) shows that T satisfies (ROFD)–electricity is freely
disposable. Figure 3(b) also shows that T satisfies (CDB). Note that
PT (y, z) = {〈x1, x2〉 ∈ R2+|
y2
z2
≤ x1x2 ∧ z − γ
α
≤ x1 ≤ z
γ
}, (4.23)
which demonstrates that T violates input free-disposability with respect to coal but satis-
fies the same with respect to labor.
The restriction of the technology PT (x1, x2) for 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ ΘyT is seen in Figure 3(b).
It is clear from this figure that the functional representation of T is
T := {〈x1, x2, y, z〉 ∈ R4+| x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 ≥ αx1 ∧ αx1 ≤ z ≤ min{γ + αx1, x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 } ∧
y ≤ x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 − αx1 − z}
(4.24)
and that the correspondence P y() is single valued with image
P y(x1, x2) = 〈z, y〉 = 〈αx1, x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 − αx1〉, ∀ 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ ΘyT . (4.25)
Thus, all conclusions of Theorem 6 hold for this example.
4.4. Example 4 (leguminous plants in agriculture): An output as a source of emission and
a positive emission externality on intended production.
Consider a farmer who produces, as his intended outputs, a leguminous crop (y1)
such as peas, beans, lentils, etc. and a non-leguminous crop (y2) such as rice employing
the inputs of labor (x1) and nitrogenous fertilizer. The nitrogenous fertilizer is obtained
as a by-product (z) that is produced by his leguminous crop.51 Thus, in this example, z
imposes a positive externality on intended production. m = 2, m1 = 1, n = 1, n1 = 0,
and the IPT and BPT are
T1 = {〈x, y1, y2, 0, 0, 0, z〉 ∈ R7+| y1 ≤ x
1
2 z − y2} and
T2 = {〈x, y1, y2, 0, 0, z, 0〉 ∈ R7+| γ + αy1 ≥ z ≥ αy1},
(4.26)
49 Figure 3(b) verifies this for given values of all inputs.
50 As noted above, this example violated Assumption (a) of Theorem 4.
51 Leguminous plants are highly desirable crops in agriculture, as they have the ability to fix atmospheric
nitrogen, due to a symbiotic relationship with bacteria (rhizobia) found in root nodules of these plants.
The ability to form this symbiosis reduces fertilizer costs for farmers and gardeners who grow legumes,
and allows legumes to be used in a crop rotation to replenish soil that has been depleted of nitrogen.
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from which we can derive T = T (T1, T2). The various projections of the IPT and BPT
can be defined as before. Here we study the structures of various restrictions of the IPT
and BPT, whenever these restrictions are non-empty. The restrictions
PT1(x, y1, y2) = {z ∈ R+| z ≥
y1 + y2
x
1
2
} and
PT2(x, y1, y2) = {z ∈ R+| γ + αy1 ≥ z ≥ αy1}
(4.27)
show that Assumption (a) of Theorem 4 is violated by this example. Moreover, both these
restrictions impose non-trivial lower bounds on the emission.52 Hence, the function g()
inherits properties from both the IPT and the BPT. However, PT1(x, y1, y2) imposes no
upper bound on the emission, and hence g¯() inherits properties only from the BPT:
g(x, y1, y2) = max{y1 + y2
x
1
2
, αy1}
g¯(x, y1, y2) = γ + αy1.
(4.28)
The structures of the following restrictions, show that Assumption (b) of Theorem 4
holds for this example:
PT1(x, y1, z) = {y1 ∈ R+| y2 ≤ x
1
2 z − y1} and
PT2(x, y1, z) = R+,
(4.29)
Hence f2(), the maximum amount of the non-emission generating non-leguminous crop,
inherits its properties only from the IPT:
f2(x, y1, z) = x
1
2 z − y1. (4.30)
Each of the following restrictions has a well-defined upper bound.
PT1(x, y2, z) = {y1 ∈ R+| y1 ≤ x
1
2 z − y2} and
PT2(x, y2, z) = {y1 ∈ R+|
z − γ
α
≤ y1 ≤ z
α
}
(4.31)
Thus f1(), the emission generating leguminous crop, inherits its properties from both the
IPT and the BPT.
f1(x, y2, z) = min{x
1
2 z − y2, z
α
}. (4.32)
The upper bounds of both restrictions in (4.31) are increasing in z.53 This shows that
f1() is increasing in z. Hence, it violates the monotonicity properties of part (v) in the
definition of (BP). Hence T violates (BP). However, it satisfies (WBP). (4.31) shows that
52 PT1(x, y1, y2) shows that there is a minimal amount of nitrogen required to produce fixed levels of
both intended crops when labor input is also held fixed.
53 This is because z imposes a positive externality on intended production and z is caused by y1 in
nature’s BPT.
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T violates free disposability of the leguminous crop. But (4.29) shows that T satisfies the
free disposability of the non-leguminous crop, i.e., (ROFD) holds. (4.27) and (4.28) show
that T satisfies (CDB). Further, since the BPT is unaffected by labor,
PT (y1, y2, z) = {x ∈ R+|x ≥ [y1 + y2
z
]
2
} (4.33)
shows that T satisfies free-disposability of labor. Thus, conclusions of Theorem 6 hold.
Figure 4(a) shows that the restriction
PT (x, y2) = PT1(x, y2) ∩ PT2(x, y2)
= {〈z, y1〉 ∈ R2+| y1 ≤ x
1
2 z − y2 ∧ γ + αy1 ≥ z ≥ αy1}
(4.34)
is non-empty if and only if γ ≥ y2
x
1
2
.54 Figure 4(b) show that the restriction
PT (x, y1) = PT1(x, y1) ∩ PT2(x, y1)
= {〈z, y2〉 ∈ R2+| y2 ≤ x
1
2 z − y1 ∧ γ + αy1 ≥ z ≥ αy1}
(4.35)
is non-empty if and only if αy1 ≥ y1
x
1
2
.55 In this example, f1() and g() are inverses of one
another. Figure 4(a) demonstrates this. Figure 4(b) shows that the graphs of g() and f2()
can also coincide at more than one point. Thus, the correspondences
P 2(x, y1) =
{〈z, y2〉 ∈ R2+| y2 = x 12 z − y1 ∧ z = max{y1 + y2
x
1
2
, αy1}
}
P 1(x, y2) =
{〈z, y1〉 ∈ R2+| y1 = min{x 12 z − y2, zα}}
(4.36)
are not single valued.56 A functional representations of T (see Theorem 6) is
T =
{〈x, y1, y2, z〉 ∈ R4+| 〈x, y1, y2〉 ∈ ΩT ∧ 〈x, y1, z〉 ∈ Ξ2T ∧ y2 ≤ x 12 z − y1 ∧
max{y1 + y2
x
1
2
, αy1} ≤ z ≤ γ + αy1
}
.
(4.37)
54 This inequality defines Θ1T .
55 This inequality defines Θ2T .
56 This is unlike the case where T satisfies (BP).
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5. The marginal abatement cost of emissions: the by-production approach.
In this section we focus on technologies that satisfy (BP) and show that the by-
production approach to modeling technologies which generate emissions allows us to clearly
distinguish between and delineate all options that are available to firms for reducing/
abating the generation of emissions. In particular, for a fixed technology, generation of
emissions can be reduced by any emission generating firm if it (i) increases the amounts of
resources that it diverts towards cleaning up (emission-mitigation) activities, i.e., increases
c, or (ii) reduces the use of inputs that cause emissions, i.e., reduces x1, or (iii) reduces the
production of intended outputs that cause pollution, i.e., reduces y1, or (iv) substitutes
away from inputs that are more intensive in producing the emissions to relatively cleaner
(or perfectly clean) inputs. It is usually felt that all such changes in production strategies
are costly in terms of the firm’s resources. Here, we model two types of cost–technical cost
of abatement and the economic cost of abatement. The former is defined as the reduction
in the intended output of the firm when the firm reduces its emission, while the latter refers
to the loss in profits of the firm when it reduces its emission. Emission reduction can also
be achieved by technological changes that increase the productivity of inputs (especially,
the cleaner inputs) of intended production or the effectiveness of cleaning-up options of
firms.
5.1. Nature’s emission generating industry and a simple model of by-production.
The nature’s BPT (EGT)57 is governed by certain universal laws, namely, the physical
and chemical reactions which relate the level of emissions to the amounts of inputs and
intended outputs that produce these emissions.58 Hence, it is perhaps reasonable to assume
that these laws are common to all firms. In other words, it is as if there is an emission
generating industry defined by nature where (a) each firm in this industry has the same
EGT, (b) entry of new firms into this industry does not change the aggregate technology
of this industry, i.e., the laws of nature governing emission generation apply at both firm-
specific and aggregate levels, and (c) every firm necessarily enters this industry the moment
it uses or produces goods in its intended production that trigger off the laws of nature
that govern emission generation.
If the emission generating mechanism is viewed in this light, then it implies that the
underlying EGT is additive: if there are L firms indexed by l then (i) the EGT is common
to all firms, i.e.,
T l2 = T2 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ , ∀ l = 1, . . . , L, (5.1)
57 Evocatively, in this section, we will call a by-product producing technology (BPT) an emission gen-
erating technology (EGT).
58 For example, the extent to which a given volume of coal can produce smoke can be thought of as a
relation determined by nature.
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and (ii) the aggregate technology of nature’s emission generating industry is the same as
the common technology of firms in this industry, i.e.,
L∑
l
T l2 = T2. (5.2)
One candidate for such an EGT is an EGT that exhibits constant returns to scale. In
the following sections we assume a linear structure for the EGT. This ensures that the
EGT is additive. However, the linear structure rules out all second-order effects of changes
in emission causing inputs and outputs on emission generation–we are not sure of these
properties of nature’s laws of emission generation and hence suppress them in the analysis
below. We rely only on the standard assumptions made in the literature regarding intended
production to unravel the properties of the abatement costs of emission generating firms.
We study a simple model where the firm produces a single output y and a single
emission z. It also undertakes cleaning-up efforts c. It employs three inputs, x1, x2, and
x3. In nature, emissions are potentially caused by x1 and x2.
59 The IPT and the EGT
have the following forms:
T1 = {〈x1, x2, x3, y, 0, c, 0, 0, z〉 ∈ R9+| y ≤ F (x1, x2, x3, c)}
T2 = {〈x1, x2, x3, 0, y, 0, c, z, 0〉 ∈ R9+| z ≥ α1x1 + α2x2 − βc}.
(5.3)
Let T denote T (T1, T2) ⊂ Rn+m+2+ that is derived from (5.3). We assume that F () is
concave and smooth in the interior of its domain. The derivatives of F () satisfy Fc() < 0,
Fi() > 0 for i = 1, . . . , 3, and Fi,c() = 0 for i = 1, 2. These sign restrictions capture the fact
that the marginal productivities of all inputs are positive in intended production and that
production of cleaning-up activities is not intensive in inputs x1 and x2.
60 The production
of cleaning-up activities is, however, costly in terms of a firm’s resources: x3 is a common
input that is shared between the production of y and the production of c. It is not the cause
of emissions in nature. A greater amount of x3 facilitates both an increase in production
of the intended output and a reduction in emissions. In our analysis, however, we wish
to focus purely on those abatement strategies of firms that potentially involve a trade-off
between intended production and emission reduction. For this purpose we restrict our
analysis to abatement strategies of firms which involve no change in the level of the third
input, i.e., the level of this input will be held fixed. This implies that different abatement
strategies of firms will generally involve different distributions of the fixed amount of input
three between the production of y and the production of c. We will assume throughout
59 In the next section, we interpret these as two fuel inputs used by the firm which produce energy.
60 The simple models we study are only illustrative examples to study the issue of abatement costs
employing the by-production approach. The assumption Fi,c() = 0 for i = 1, 2 can of course be generalized
if this assumption is empirically false. However, in that case, many of the derivatives of the marginal
abatement cost function that we obtain below will have ambiguous signs. Assuming Fi,c() = 0 is convenient
and leads to definitive signs for these derivatives which are consistent with views in the literature or are
intuitively meaningful.
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the next two sections that the firm always operates in a technically efficient manner, that
is, its choice of the production vectors 〈x1, x2, x3, y, c, z〉 ∈ R6+ are such that
y = F (x1, x2, x3, c)
z = α1x1 + α2x2 − βc.
(5.4)
5.2. The marginal technical cost of abatement (MTCA) and its properties.
In this section, we interpret the simple model above to be the model of a technol-
ogy that is energy intensive. Inputs one and two are two sources of energy. These two
have different abilities to produce the energy input, in addition to the differences in their
propensities to generate emissions. Thus, in this section, the function F () is assumed to
have the following form:
F (x1, x2, x3, c) = f(e(x1, x2), x3, c). (5.5)
Here, we interpret e() as the aggregator function that specifies the total energy input
obtained from employing x1 and x2 amounts, respectively, of inputs one and two. Let us
make a further simplifying assumption:
e(x1, x2) = θ1x1 + θ2x2 (5.6)
with θ1 > θ2, i.e., input one is more productive in energy production than input two. At
the same time, we also assume that α1 > α2, i.e., input 1 has a greater propensity to
generate emissions that input two. β measures the effectiveness of the cleaning-up efforts
of the firm in reducing emissions. We assume β > 0, α1 > 0, and α2 ≥ 0. If α2 = 0
then input 2 is a perfectly clean input (has no impurities) and hence is not a source of
emission even though it is a source of energy input for the firm. Thus, in this case n2 = 2
and n1 = 1.
61 On the other hand, if α2 > 0, then n1 = 2 and n2 = 1.
62 Technological
developments in cleaner methods for producing intended outputs increase the value of
θ2, that is, make the clean(er) input more productive in producing energy for intended
production. Technological development can also improve the effectiveness of cleaning-up
methods used by the firm, i.e., increase the value of β. We assume, however, that α1 and
α2 are defined by nature. The derivatives of f() satisfy fe() > 0, f3() > 0, fc() < 0, and
fe,c() = 0.
In this simple model, the different abatement options open to a firm include cleaning-
up activities, reduction in the usage of inputs (fuel-inputs) that cause emissions, and
switching between inputs (inter-fuel substitution) that vary in terms of their emission gen-
erating propensities. Starting at an initial efficient production vector 〈x¯1, x¯2, x¯3, y¯, c¯, z¯〉 ∈
61 Examples of such inputs include wind, solar, or hydro power to generate energy.
62 Example of such an input is a cleaner variety of coal that has less carbon content, and hence, is less
productive in energy generation, while at the same time has a smaller propensity to generate emissions.
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T , an abatement strategy of the firm is assumed to be a linear path of inputs and cleaning-
up activities of the firm that is parametrized by the mapping δ : R+ → R3+ with image
δ(t) =
x1(t) = x¯1 + x˙1tx2(t) = x¯2 + x˙2t
c(t) = c¯+ c˙t
 (5.7)
Denote the gradient of δ with respect to t by ∇tδ. Then, (5.7) indicates that
∇tδ(t) = [ x˙1 x˙2 c˙ ] =: δ˙. (5.8)
Each linear path δ(t) involves a particular mix of rates of change in x1, x2, and c. Note,
δ(0) = 〈x¯1, x¯2, c¯〉 and, for a given technology, different values of x˙1, x˙2, and c˙ coincide with
different paths (different strategies) of abatement undertaken by the firm. We restrict our
analysis to linear paths δ(t) for which ‖ δ˙ ‖= 1.63 δ˙ is thus a direction of change in all
inputs and cleaning-up efforts of a firm, starting from an initial production vector.
The path of production of the intended output and emissions induced by any path
δ(t) of inputs and cleaning-up effort is
y = f(θ1x1(t) + θ2x2(t), x¯3, c(t))
z¯ −∆ = z¯ −∆(t) := α1x1(t) + α2x2(t)− βc(t)
(5.9)
so that z(0) = z¯, ∆(0) = 0, and y(0) = y¯. ∆(t) is the total abatement (the change/
reduction) in the emissions from the initial level z¯. From (5.9) it follows that
z¯ −∆(t) = α1x1(t) + α2x2(t)− βc(t)
⇒z¯ −∆(t) = α1[x¯1 + x˙1t] + α2[x¯2 + x˙2t]− β[c¯+ c˙t]
⇒z¯ −∆(t) = z¯ + [α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙]t
⇒−∆(t) = [α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙]t.
(5.10)
From (5.10) it follows that starting from an initial production vector, abatement is in-
creasing along the path δ(t) if
∂∆(t)
∂t
= −[α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙] > 0. (5.11)
In that case, the function ∆(t) is invertible and (5.10) implies
t =
−∆
α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙ . (5.12)
Employing (5.12) and substituting for t in the first equation of (5.9), we obtain
y =
f
( 2∑
i=1
θi[x¯i +
−∆x˙i
α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙ ], x¯3, c¯+
−∆c˙
α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙
) (5.13)
63 ‖ δ˙ ‖= 1 denotes the Euclidean norm of δ˙ ∈ R3.
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We define the technical cost of abatement function CT : R8+ → R+ with image
CT (∆, θ1, θ2, β, x¯1, x¯2, x¯3, c¯) = f
(
θ1x¯1 + θ2x¯2, x¯3, c¯
) −
f
( 2∑
i=1
θi[x¯i +
−∆x˙i
α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙ ], x¯3, c¯+
−∆c˙
α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙
)
.
(5.14)
CT () is the change in intended output from the initial level y¯ due to any linear path δ(t)
of inputs and cleaning-up effort chosen by the firm, that results in a path ∆(t) of total
abatement.
In the context of the model described above, for any given path of abatement chosen
by a firm, we derive the marginal technical cost of abatement (MTCA) and study its
properties. Our aim is two-fold: (i) to study the properties of MTCA along any path of
abatement adopted by the firm and (ii) given any path of abatement adopted by a firm, to
study the effect of changes in technology and the differences in the initial levels of usage
of inputs and the initial cleaning-up efforts on MTCA. Along any such path, the marginal
technical cost of abatement is given by the derivative:
∂CT (∆, θ1, θ2, β, x¯1, x¯2, x¯3, c¯)
∂∆
≡ CT∆(∆, θ1, θ2, β, x¯1, x¯2, x¯3, c¯)
=
fe()[θ1x˙1 + θ2x˙2] + fc() c˙
α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙ .
(5.15)
To see how the marginal technical cost of abatement varies with the abatement level along
any path of abatement chosen by a firm, we consider the derivative of CT∆() with respect
to ∆64:
∂2CT ()
∂∆2
=: CT∆,∆() = −
fe,e() [θ1x˙1 + θ2x˙2]
2 + fc,c()c˙
2
[α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙]2 ,
(5.16)
Similarly, we can also study how the marginal technical cost of abatement varies with
the initial levels of inputs one and two, the initial level of cleaning-up efforts of the firm,
and the productivities θ1 and θ2 of inputs one and two:
∂2CT ()
∂∆∂x¯1
=: CT∆,x¯1() =
θ1 fe,e() [θ1x˙1 + θ2x˙2]
α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙ ,
∂2CT ()
∂∆∂x¯2
=: CT∆,x¯2() =
θ2 fe,e() [θ1x˙1 + θ2x˙2]
α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙ ,
∂2CT ()
∂∆∂c¯
=: CT∆,c¯() =
fc,c()c˙
α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙ ,
∂2CT ()
∂∆∂β
=: CT∆,β() = −
[θ1x˙1 + θ2x˙2]
2c˙fe,e()∆ + c˙
3fc,c()∆− c˙[α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙]2∇∆CT ()
[α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙]3
,
(5.17)
64 Recall, fe,c() = 0.
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∂2CT ()
∂∆∂θ2
=: CT∆,θ2() =
x2()fe,e()[θ1x˙1 + θ2x˙2] + fe()x˙2
α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙ , and
∂2CT ()
∂∆∂θ1
=: CT∆,θ1() =
x1()fe,e()[θ1x˙1 + θ2x˙2] + fe()x˙1
α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙ .
(5.18)
Consider, first, three obvious paths of abatement reductions that are available to a
firm:
(1) ceteris-paribus, reduction in the energy intensive inputs: δ(t) such that c˙ = 0, x˙1 ≤
0, x˙2 ≤ 0, and 〈x˙1, x˙2〉 6= 0,
(2) ceteris paribus, a switch from the more emission generating to the less emission gen-
erating input (inter-fuel substitution): δ(t) such that c˙ = 0 and x˙1 = −x˙2 and x˙2 > 0,
and
(3) ceteris paribus, an increase in its cleaning up efforts: δ(t) such that c˙ > 0, x˙1 = x˙2 =
0.
From (5.11) it follows that, along all the three paths above, abatement is increasing:
α1x˙1 + α2x˙2 − βc˙ < 0. (5.19)
Theorem 7: : Along paths 1 to 3 of abatement,
(i) CT∆(∆, θ1, θ2, β, x¯1, x¯2, c¯) > 0,
(ii) CT∆,∆(∆, θ1, θ2, β, x¯1, x¯2, c¯) > 0,
(iii) CT∆,x¯i(∆, θ1, θ2, β, x¯1, x¯2, c¯) < 0, ∀ i = 1, 2,
(iv) CT∆,c¯(∆, θ1, θ2, β, x¯1, x¯2, c¯) > 0, and
(v) CT∆,β(∆, θ1, θ2, β, x¯1, x¯2, c¯) < 0.
Along path 2 of abatement,
(vi) CT∆,θ2(∆, θ1, θ2, β, x¯1, x¯2, c¯) < 0 and
(vii) the sign of CT∆,θ1(∆, θ1, θ2, β, x¯1, x¯2, c¯) is ambiguous.
Along path 1 of abatement,
(viii) the sign of CT∆,θi(∆, θ1, θ2, β, x¯1, x¯2, c¯) for i = 1, 2 is ambiguous.
Proof: Follows from (5.19), (5.15), (5.16), (5.18), and our (standard) curvature and mono-
tonicity assumptions on the intended production function f().
This result is quite intuitive: Along all the three paths of abatement above, the
MTCA is positive ((i) of Theorem 7) because along all these paths, abatement comes
at the cost of reduction of the intended output–this is either because it entails, ceteris
paribus, a reduction in some inputs or because, ceteris paribus, a greater diversion of the
fixed amount of input three from the production of y to the production of c or because,
ceteris paribus, a substitution from an input that is more productive in intended production
to a relatively less productive input.
Along all the three paths of abatement above, MTCA is increasing in the level of
abatement ((ii) of Theorem 7) because of diminishing returns to resources in intended
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production. Abatement path 1 implies that, ceteris paribus, as the fuel intensive inputs
are reduced more and more, the loss in intended output increases due to the phenomenon
of diminishing returns to these inputs (fe,e() < 0). Abatement path 2 implies that, ceteris
paribus, as more and more inter-fuel substitution takes place towards the fuel that is less
energy intensive, the energy input into intended input falls, diminishing returns to energy
kicks in, and the loss in intended output increases; abatement path 3 implies that, ceteris
paribus, as the firm undertakes more and more cleaning-up activities c, more and more
of the fixed input x3 is diverted away from production of y. Diminishing returns to this
input in the production of c implies that more and more of the intended output has to be
given up to produce more and more of c (fc,c() < 0)).
Along paths 1 and 2 of abatement above, MTCA is (non-trivially) decreasing in the
initial amounts of each of the energy-generating inputs ((iii) of Theorem 7): marginal
costs of firms employing higher amounts of the emission generating inputs is lower. This
is again due to the phenomenon of diminishing returns in intended production: at higher
levels of usage of fuel inputs, the marginal productivities of these inputs is lower. Hence,
for these firms, ceteris paribus, a reduction in the usage of these inputs or a switch to the
relatively less energy intensive input implies a smaller reduction in the intended output
than for firms which are employing lower amounts of these inputs,
Along path 3 of abatement above, MTCA is increasing in the initial amount of
cleaning-up efforts ((iv) of Theorem 7): MTCAs of firms engaging in higher amounts
of the cleaning-up activities is higher. This is because firms for which c¯ is higher, the
marginal productivity of inputs in producing cleaning-up output is lower due to dimin-
ishing returns, and hence, ceteris paribus, an increase in c requires a greater diversion of
input three from y to c for these firms than for firms whose initial levels of cleaning-up is
lower.
Along all the three paths of abatement above, MTCA is decreasing in the effectiveness
β of cleaning-up effort of a firm in reducing emissions ((v) of Theorem 7). As β increases,
smaller reductions in fuel inputs or lesser switching to the less productive fuel input or
smaller increases in the amounts of cleaning-up efforts are required to generate a given
amount of abatement ∆. Hence, diminishing returns implies lower reductions in intended
outputs for firms with higher values of β.
Along path 2 of abatement above, MTCA is decreasing in the productivity of energy
input x2: marginal abatement costs of firms with higher θ2 is lower or as θ2 increases with
technological development, MTCAs fall. There are two effects on MTCA of an increase in
θ2; (a) holding the marginal product of energy input fixed, an increase in θ2 implies that the
decrease in the energy input due to inter-fuel substitution towards the less fuel intensive
input is lower and (b) holding the decrease in energy input due to inter-fuel substitution
fixed, an increase in θ2, ceteris paribus, implies a higher amount of the energy input,
and hence, decreases the marginal productivity of the energy input due to diminishing
returns. On the other hand, along path 1 (x˙2 < 0) of abatement above, nothing can be
said about how the MTCA will change due to an increase in θ2: an argument similar to
(b) above holds but (a) may not along this path of abatement. Similarly, we can explain
the remaining parts of Theorem 7.
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Starting from any initial production vector, the by-production approach to modeling
technologies that generate emissions also shows the existence of abatement strategies which
lead to both higher abatement levels and lower reductions in output. This is possible, for
example, when at the initial production vectors differences exist in the marginal rates
of technical substitutions between energy generating inputs in emission reductions and
intended production, i.e., θ1θ2 6=
α1
α2
.
Theorem 8: Let 〈x¯1, x¯2, x¯3, y¯, c¯, z¯〉 ∈ R6+ be an initial production vector such that
y¯ = f(θ1x¯1 + θ2x¯2, x¯3, c¯)
z¯ = α1x¯1 + α2x¯2 − βc¯.
(5.20)
Suppose at least one of the following holds:
(i) θ1θ2 6=
α1
α2
or
(ii) θ1 fe(x¯1,x¯2,x¯3,c¯),fc(x¯1,x¯2,x¯3,c¯) 6=
α1
−β .
Then there exist paths of abatement δ(t) associated with directions of change δ˙ = 〈x˙1, x˙2, c˙〉
such that MTCA is negative, that is, ∇∆C() < 0.
Proof: (i) If θ1θ2 >
α1
α2
, then choose c˙ = 0, x˙1 = 1 and x˙2 < 0 such that −θ1θ2 < x˙2 < −
α1
α2
.
If θ1θ2 <
α1
α2
, then choose c˙ = 0, x˙1 = −1 and x˙2 > 0 such that θ1θ2 < x˙2 <
α1
α2
. In both cases,
we find that θ1x˙1 + θ2x˙2 > 0 and α1x˙1 + α2 + x˙2 < 0 and, hence, ∇∆C() < 0.
(ii) Similar to proof of part (i).
This result is also intuitive. When θ1θ2 >
α1
α2
, then for a given increase in the usage of
fuel input x1, the maximum that the firm is willing to give up of fuel input x2 to ensure
at least the original level of intended output y is greater than the minimum amount of
fuel input x2 that it needs to give up to ensure at least the original level of abatement ∆.
Thus, any decrease in usage of fuel input x2 that lies between these two bounds implies
both an increase in intended output and a greater reduction of emissions.65
5.3. The marginal economic cost of abatement (MECA).
Assuming that a firm maximizes profits, what is the loss in its profits when it is subject
to an environmental regulation that requires it to reduce its emission? We define this loss
as the firm’s economic cost of abatement. We employ the technological specifications
in (5.3). Let 〈py, p1, p2, p3〉 ∈ R4+ be a vector of output and input prices faced by the
65 The derivates in (5.18) can be used also to understand how the MTAC will vary along a path of firm
characteristics, starting from an initial configuration of firm characteristics 〈x¯1, x¯2, c¯, β, θ1, θ2〉 ∈ R6++.
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firm. The profit function of a firm with technology T (T1, T2) ⊂ Rn+m+2+ is derived as the
mapping Π : R7+ → R+ with image
Π(z¯,∆, py, p1, p2, p3, x¯3) := max pyy −
2∑
i=1
pixi − p3x¯3
subject to
y ≤ F (x1, x2, x¯3, c) and
z¯ −∆ ≥
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc.
(5.21)
The Lagrangian of this problem is
L() = pyy −
2∑
i=1
pixi − p3x¯3 − µ[y − F (x1, x2, x¯3, c)]− ρ[
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc− z¯ + ∆], (5.22)
where µ ∈ R and ρ ∈ R are the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints imposed by
the IPT and the BPT, respectively. Note, given the inequalities that characterize the
constraints in (5.21), at the optimum, they will necessarily be non-negative.
The initial level of profits prior is defined as the value Π(z¯,∆, py, p1, p2, p3, x¯3) when
∆ = 0. We denote this by p¯i. We define the economic cost of abatement as the reduction in
the initial level of profits due to abatement constraints. The economic cost of abatement
function is the mapping: CE : R7+ → R+ with image
CE(z¯,∆, py, p1, p2, p3, x¯3) := p¯i − Π(z¯,∆, py, p1, p2, p3, x¯3). (5.23)
The marginal economic cost of abatement (MECA) is thus the derivative of CE() with
respect to ∆. Employing the envelope theorem, from (5.22), it follows that it takes the
form
∇∆CE() ≡ ∂C
E(z¯,∆, py, p1, p2, p3, x¯3)
∂∆
= −∂Π(z¯,∆, py, p1, p2, p3, x¯3)
∂∆
= ρ(z¯,∆, py, p1, p2, p3, x¯3) ≥ 0.
(5.24)
Noting from (5.22) that
∂Π(z¯,∆,py,p1,p2,p3,x¯3)
∂∆ = −∂Π(z¯,∆,py,p1,p2,p3,x¯3)∂z¯ , it follows that
∇∆,∆CE() ≡ ∂
2CE()
∂∆2
=
∂ρ(z¯,∆, py, p1, p2, p3, x¯3)
∂∆
and
∇z¯,∆CE() ≡ ∂
2CE()
∂z¯∂∆
=
∂ρ(z¯,∆, py, p1, p2, p3, x¯3)
∂z¯
= −∂
2CE()
∂∆2
.
(5.25)
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We will now study how MECA varies with the level of abatement and the initial level
of emission. To do so, we employ standard comparative static methods. The first-order
conditions of the problem (5.21) are
py − µ = 0,
− p1 + µF1()− ρα1 = 0,
− p2 + µF2()− ρα2 = 0,
µFc() + ρβ = 0,
y − F (x1, x2, x¯3, c) = 0, and
2∑
i=1
αixi − βc− z¯ + ∆ = 0.
(5.26)
Let the first-order conditions in (5.26) be represented by the vector-valued implicit function
G(y, x1, x2, c, µ, ρ, z¯,∆, p1, p2, p3, x¯3) = 0, (5.27)
where 〈y, x1, x2, c, µ, ρ〉 ∈ R6+ are the endogenous variables and 〈z¯,∆, p1, p2, p3, x¯3〉 ∈
R6+ are the exogenous variables. Focusing only on the comparative statics of the choice
variables with respect to ∆ and differentiating (5.27) we obtain
∇y,x1,x2,c,µ,ρG() ·

dy
dx1
dx2
dc
dµ
dρ
 = −∇∆G() · d∆, (5.28)
where ∇y,x1,x2,c,µ,ρG() and ∇∆G() are the Jacobians
∇y,x1,x2,c,µ,ρG() =

0 0 0 0 −1 0
0 µF1,1() µF1,2() 0 F1() −α1
0 µF1,2() µF2,2() 0 F2() −α2
0 0 0 Fc,c() Fc() β
1 −F1() −F2() −Fc() 0 0
0 α1 α2 −β 0 0
 and ∇∆G() =

0
0
0
0
0
1
 .
(5.29)
Employing the implicit function theorem, from (5.28) we can solve for the following local
derivatives: 
∂y()
∂∆
∂x1()
∂∆
∂x2()
∂∆
∂c()
∂∆
∂µ()
∂∆
∂ρ()
∂∆

= [∇y,x1,x2,c,µ,ρG()]−1∇∆G() (5.30)
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Straightforward application of the Crammer’s rule allows us to solve (5.30) and we obtain
the following:
∂y()
∂∆
=
µ2Fc,c[−F1,1F2α2 + F1,2[F1α2 + F2α1]− F2,2F1α1] + µ2Fc[F1,1F2,2 − F 21,2]
µ2Fc,c[F1,1α22 + F2,2α
2
1 − 2α1α2F1,2] + β2µ2[F1,1F2,2 − F 21,2]
,
(5.31)
∂x1()
∂∆
=
µ2Fc,c[α2F1,2 − α1F2,2]
µ2Fc,c[F1,1α22 + F2,2α
2
1 − 2α1α2F1,2] + β2µ2[F1,1F2,2 − F 21,2]
, (5.32)
∂x2()
∂∆
=
µ2Fc,c[α1F1,2 − α2F1,1]
µ2Fc,c[F1,1α22 + F2,2α
2
1 − 2α1α2F1,2] + β2µ2[F1,1F2,2 − F 21,2]
, (5.33)
∂c()
∂∆
=
βµ2[F1,1F2,2 − F 21,2]
µ2Fc,c[F1,1α22 + F2,2α
2
1 − 2α1α2F1,2] + β2µ2[F1,1F2,2 − F 21,2]
, and (5.34)
∂ρ()
∂∆
=
−µ3Fc,c[F1,1F2,2 − F 21,2]
µ2Fc,c[F1,1α22 + F2,2α
2
1 − 2α1α2F1,2] + β2µ2[F1,1F2,2 − F 21,2]
. (5.35)
Theorem 9: If, in addition to the maintained assumptions,
(1) F () is strictly concave and F1,2() ≥ 0 then
∂y()
∂∆
< 0,
∂x1()
∂∆
< 0,
∂x2()
∂∆
< 0,
∂c()
∂∆
> 0,
∂ρ()
∂∆
> 0, and (5.36)
(2) F () takes the form in (5.5), (5.6) is true, 〈p1, p2〉 is proportional to 〈θ1, θ2〉 then66
∂y()
∂∆
= 0,
∂x1()
∂∆
= −∂x2()
∂∆
θ2
θ1
,
∂c()
∂∆
= 0, and
∂ρ()
∂∆
= 0. (5.37)
Proof: (1) follows in a straightforward manner given all the assumptions on F (). (2)
follows from the fact that for i, i′ = 1, 2, Fi() = θife() and Fi,i′() = θiθi′fe,e(). In particular,
note that, in this case, we have F1,2() < 0, F1,1()F2,2()− F 21,2() = 0, and ∂x1()∂∆ < 0 if and
only if α1α2 >
θ1
θ2
.
Corollary to Theorem 9: If, in addition to the maintained assumptions, F () satisfies
conditions in (1) of Theorem 9 then ∂
2CE()
∂∆2
> 0 and ∂
2CE()
∂z¯∂∆ < 0. If, in addition to the main-
tained assumptions, F () satisfies conditions in (2) of Theorem 9 then ∂
2CE()
∂∆2
= ∂
2CE()
∂z¯∂∆ = 0.
66 This corresponds to an initial (optimal) production vector where ρ = 0, i.e., when the firm is unreg-
ulated (∆ = 0).
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Proof: Follows from (5.25).
If the firm is a price taker and is mandated to reduce its initial level of emission, then
it will (endogenously) choose that path of abatement that maximizes its profits. Along
such a path, in general, the signs of the derivatives in (5.31) to (5.35) depend on the sign
of F1,2(). If this is negligible or non-negative then part (1) of Theorem 9 says that, along
the optimal path of abatement chosen by the firm, the firm meets its mandated abatement
requirement by reducing the use of both its fuel inputs and increasing its cleaning-up
efforts. Hence, along this path, its output will fall. The corollary to Theorem 9 says
that, along this path, MECA of the firm increases with increase in abatement, while it
decreases with increase in the initial level of emissions, a phenomenon which again invokes
the economic law of diminishing returns. If, however, F () assumes the form in (5.5) and
(5.6), then part (2) and the corollary of Theorem 9 say that, along the optimal path chosen
by the firm, MECA is constant and the firm meets its abatement requirements purely by
adopting the inter-fuel substitution strategy. Reduction in emission is achieved by no
change in its output or cleaning-up effort.
5.4. Marginal abatement costs: The input approach and the by-production approach.
The single-equation input approach treats the emission as a standard input of production.
It explains the positive correlation between emissions and intended outputs solely in terms
of cleaning-up effort of the firm and not in terms of commodities x1 and y1: the more the
resources are diverted towards cleaning up the less is the emission produced and the less is
the intended output.67 However, cleaning-up effort of the firm is not explicitly modeled.
Thus, it considers a reduced-form production relation:
y = h(x1, x2, x3, z), hi() > 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , 3, ∧ hz() > 0. (5.38)
In the framework of our simple model in (5.3), it is as if this reduced form technology has
been derived from the following two production relations corresponding to an IPT and an
EGT, respectively:
y = F (x1, x2, x3, c)
z = z¯ − βc (5.39)
where z¯ ∈ R+ is the initial level of the emission.68 This implies that
h(x1, x2, x3, z) = F (x1, x2, x3,
z¯ − z
β
) (5.40)
67 See Baumol and Oats [1988] and Cropper and Oates [1992].
68 Note, the EGT is independent of x1 and y1.
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Consider the behavior of a firm with technology (5.38) when a Pigouvian tax t is imposed
on it.
Πt(z¯, t, py, p1, p2, p3, x¯3) := max pyy −
2∑
i=1
pixi − p3x¯3 − tz
subject to
y ≤ h(x1, x2, x¯3, z).
(5.41)
Standard comparative static exercise demonstrates to us how the firm will respond to
changes in the Pigouvian tax:69
∂z
∂t
=
µˆ2[h1,1h2,2 − h21,2]
µˆ|H| < 0
∂x1
∂t
=
µˆ[h1,2h2,z − h1,zh2,2]
µˆ|H| = 0
∂x2
∂t
=
µˆ[h1,2h1,z − h2,zh1,1]
µˆ|H| = 0
∂c
∂t
= − 1
β
∂z
∂t
> 0.
(5.42)
Thus, the optimal abatement path of the firm subject to a Pigouvian tax is one where
the firm meets the associated reductions in emission solely by increasing its cleaning-up
effort. It does not change its use of the fuel inputs or undertake inter-fuel substitution
etc.. Compare this with the case in the previous section where the firm’s EGT explicitly
modeled all goods that affect emission generation in nature:
z = α1x1 + α2x2 − βc. (5.43)
In that case, the firm’s optimal abatement strategy to meet the mandated reductions in
emission ∆ (which is dual to t) depended on the sign of F1,2(). The optimal abatement
strategies often involved combinations of options such as reducing x1, inter-fuel substitu-
tion, and increasing c. See Theorem 9.
Further, some implausible paths of changes in inputs, intended output, and emission
become technically feasible when the reduced-form technology is represented by (5.40),
with the underlying IPT and EGT in (5.39). Consider, e.g., δ(t) with c˙ = 0, x˙1 > 0,
x˙2 > 0. This results in
∂z(t)
∂t = 0. Thus, an increase in fuel inputs with no change in
cleaning-up effort has no effect on emission generation, which would seem contrary to
nature.
These results stem from the fact that the single-equation input approach ignores
the role that commodities x1 and y1 play in emission generation. It implicitly attributes
changes in emissions to only the cleaning-up efforts of the firm. Thus, this model also
restricts the set of abatement options that the firm has to only changes in its cleaning-up
effort.
69 Recall our maintained assumption that production of c only requires x3, so that hi,z() = 0 for i = 1, 2.
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6. Conclusions.
Emissions generated by firms are by-products of their intended production. In the intro-
ductory section we presented five acceptable attributes of the process of emission generation
by firms. A concept of by-production was defined. We showed that technologies of firms
that satisfy this condition possess all the five attributes and that any technology that
satisfies the Murty and Russell [2010] characterization–i.e., is derived as an intersection
of two distinct technologies, one capturing the production relations between inputs and
outputs in intended production and other capturing the production relations underlying
nature’s emission generating mechanism–satisfies by-production. While intended produc-
tion could be postulated to satisfy standard input and output free-disposability, these will
necessarily be violated by nature’s emission generation mechanism, which satisfies costly
disposability of emission as defined in Murty [2010]. We showed that the Murty and
Russell [2010] characterization is also necessary for by-production. This is because, when
by-production holds, the lower bound on emissions and the upper bounds on intended
outputs provide two production relations that describe such technologies. It was shown
that, under by-production, these two relations are distinct: the upper-bounds are defined
by the relations that govern intended production and the lower bounds are defined by the
relations in nature regarding emission generation. These two relations can be used to re-
cover the underlying intended production technology and nature’s by-product generating
technology. By-production however precludes external effects that emissions generated
by a firm can impose on its own intended production. When such external effects are
allowed then our examples showed that the technologies may violate some of the expected
correlations between emission generation and intended production.
By allowing us to distinguish between and model details about production relations
that underlie intended production and the nature’s laws regarding emission generation,
the by-production approach provides a very rich framework for studying firms’ costs of
abatement when they are mandated to reduce emissions. It is not possible to obtain
such details regarding abatement costs under existing formulations of emission generating
technologies, which are mostly in reduced-form. The importance of marginal abatement
costs for environmental policy cannot be over-stated.
The by-production approach allows us to delineate all options that are available to
firms for reducing emissions. In the simple model that we studied, such options include
reductions in fuel inputs, inter-fuel substitution, cleaning-up efforts such as aﬄuent treat-
ment plants, or technological progress that improves productivity of inputs (especially
clean inputs) or improves the effectiveness of firms’ cleaning-up efforts. We distinguished
between technical costs and economic costs of abatement. While, the former was expressed
purely in terms of the technology and considered the loss in intended outputs due to man-
dated reductions in emissions, the latter was defined in the context of economic behavior
of firms. It considered loss in maximum profits of firms when they are faced with envi-
ronmental regulation. We showed that the properties of marginal abatement costs can
be explained purely in terms of known economic laws such as “diminishing returns” in
intended production.
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In contrast, we showed that, under the standard input-approach to modeling emission
generating technologies, a firm will reduce its emissions under a Pigouvian tax solely by
increasing its cleaning-up effort. We also showed that the input approach also allows for
paths involving increases in emission causing inputs and outputs with no change in emis-
sions or cleaning-up efforts to be technologically feasible, which would seems inconsistent
with nature’s laws of emission generation.
Though some intuitively obvious abatement strategies implied that marginal techni-
cal abatement costs are increasing in abatement, it was also seen that, as long as there
are differences in the marginal rates of technical substitutions between goods in intended
production and nature’s emission producing mechanism, there also always exist strategies
that involve both greater reductions in emissions and greater production of intended out-
puts. This is true, for example, when the marginal rate of technical substitution between
two fuel inputs in producing an intended output is different from the marginal rate of
technical substitution between these inputs in producing emissions. If such abatement
strategies are not adopted by firms, then it must purely be due to the fact that they
are not profitable–presumably because of the input costs underlying them. When man-
dated to reduce emissions, profit maximizing firms internalize the nature’s by-production
technology and endogenously choose their optimal abatement strategy.
Marginal abatement costs of firms also vary depending on the characteristics of a
firm. Our model illustrated cases where marginal economic cost of abatement decreases
with increase in the initial level of emission–firms with higher initial levels of emissions have
lower marginal abatement costs. This is because of their higher use of emission causing
inputs or lower cleaning-up efforts. As a result, the law of diminishing returns implies that
their loss in intended outputs due to increase in abatement will be lower than for firms
with lower initial levels of emissions.
Our simple model for studying costs of abatement is only an illustrative example.
More complex models capturing more detailed aspects of both intended production and
nature’s laws of emission generation can be studied by employing the by-production ap-
proach. Properties of abatement cost may differ across different technological specifica-
tions.
The firm-level analysis here can perhaps be carried over to a global level with coun-
tries as the units of analysis. Inferences can be made about the division of reductions
in emissions between countries based on efficiency considerations, which usually involve
differences in marginal abatement costs between countries based on their initial levels of
emissions, use of fuel inputs, and cleaning-up efforts such as carbon sequestration efforts
etc.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1: (1) We prove the result for P j(). P¯ j() can be similarly proved.
Suppose 〈yj , z〉 ∈ P j(x, y−j , c) and 〈y¯j , z¯〉 ∈ P j(x, y−j , c) with 〈yj , z〉 6= 〈y¯j , z¯〉. Thus
yj = f
j(x, y−j , c, z) ∧ y¯j = f j(x, y−j , c, z¯)
z = g(x, y−j , c, z) ∧ z¯ = g(x, y−j , c, z)
(A.1)
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〈yj , z〉 6= 〈y¯j , z¯〉 implies yj 6= y¯j or z 6= z¯. Suppose yj 6= y¯j . Then the first part of (A.1)
is in contradiction with part (b) of (v) in the definition of (BP). If z¯ 6= z then the second
part of (A.1) is in contradiction with part (b) of (iv) in the definition of (BP).
(2) follows from part (a) of both (iv) and (v) in the definition of (BP).
Proof of Theorem 2:
(1) Suppose T satisfies (BP), (OFD), (IFD), and m1 = 0. Part (a) of (iv) in the defi-
nition of (BP) implies that there exist 〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ T , x¯1 ≥ x1 and c¯ ≤ c such that
〈x¯1, c¯〉 6= 〈x1, c〉 and g(x, y, c) < g(x¯1, x2, y, c¯). T satisfies (OFD) and (IFD) implies
〈x¯1, x2, y, c¯, z〉 ∈ T . Let z¯ = g(x¯1, x2, y, c¯) and zˆ = g(x, y, c). Then z¯ > zˆ and
〈x, y, c, zˆ〉 ∈ T . Therefore, 〈x¯1, x2, y, c¯, zˆ〉 6∈ T . A contradiction to T satisfies (OFD)
and (IFD).
(2) Suppose T satisfies (BP) and (2) in the statement of the theorem holds. Then z :=
g¯(x, y, c) > g¯(x, y¯1, y2, c) =: z¯ and 〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ T . However, z /∈ PT (x, y¯1, y2, c) since
this set is bounded above by z¯ which is less than z. Hence, 〈x, y¯1, y2, c, z〉 /∈ T .
Therefore, T does not satisfy (OFD).
Proof of Theorem 3: (1) Suppose T satisfies (BP) and (CDB) and suppose GT = F
j
T
for some j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m. Let yj = f
j(x, y−j , c, z). Then z = g(x, y, c). (CDB) implies
there exists zˆ > z such that 〈x, y−j , yj , c, zˆ〉 ∈ T . Part (b) of (v) in the definition of
(BP) implies yj = f
j(x, y−j , c, zˆ) so that 〈x, y, c, zˆ〉 ∈ F jT . But g(x, y, c) = z < zˆ. Hence,
〈x, y, c, zˆ〉 6∈ GT . This is a contradiction to GT = F jT .
(2) Suppose T satisfies (BP) and (ROFD) and suppose GT = F
j
T for some j = m1 +
1, . . . ,m. Let yj = f
j(x, y−j , c, z). Then z = g(x, y, c). (ROFD) implies there exists
yˆj < yj such that 〈x, y−j , yˆj , c, z〉 ∈ T . Part (b) of (iv) in the definition of (BP) implies
g(x, y−j , yˆj , c) = z so that 〈x, y−j , yˆj , c, z〉 ∈ GT . But f j(x, y−j , c, z) = yj > yˆj . Hence,
〈x, y−j , yˆj , c, z〉 6∈ F jT . This is a contradiction to GT = F jT .
(3) Suppose T satisfies (BP). Pick j, j′ = m1 + 1, . . . ,m such that j 6= j′. Then either
F jT = F
j′
T or F
j
T 6= F j
′
T . If F
j
T 6= F j
′
T then there exists 〈x, y, c, z〉 ∈ T such that
yj = f
j(x, y−j,j
′
, yj′ , c, z) (A.2)
but
yj′ 6= f j
′
(x, y−j,j
′
, yj , c, z) =: y˜j′ . (A.3)
(A.2) implies that
yj ∈ PT (x, y−j,j
′
, yj′ , c, z) (A.4)
and (A.3) implies that
y˜j′ > yj′ and
yj ∈ PT (x, y−j,j
′
, y˜j′ , c, z).
(A.5)
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(A.2), (A.5), and part (a) of (v) in the definition of (BP) implies that
yj = f
j(x, y−j,j
′
, yj′ , c, z) ≥ f j(x, y−j,j
′
, y˜j′ , c, z). (A.6)
If yj > f
j(x, y−j,j
′
, y˜j′ , c, z) then a contradiction to the second part of (A.5) arises. Hence,
(A.6) holds as
yj = f
j(x, y−j,j
′
, y˜j′ , c, z). (A.7)
Proof of Theorem 4: T1 and T2 are closed implies that T is closed so (i) in the definition
of (BP) is satisfied for T .
For all j = 1, . . . ,m and for all 〈x, y−j , c, z〉 ∈ ΞjT
PT (x, y
−j , c, z) :={yj ∈ R+| 〈x, y−j , yj , c, z〉 ∈ T}
={yj ∈ R+| yj ∈ PT1(x, y−j , c, z) ∩ PT2(x, y−j , c, z)}
⊆{yj ∈ R+| yj ∈ PT1(x, y−j , c, z)},
(A.8)
which is bounded following (ii) in the definition of an IPT. So (ii) in the definition of (BP)
holds for T .
Assumption (a) of the theorem and (3.14) imply
g(x, y, c) := min{z ∈ R+| z ∈ PT (x, y, c)}
= min{z ∈ R+| z ∈ R+ ∩ PT2(x, y, c)}
=GT2(x, y, c).
(A.9)
Part (a) of (iv) in the definition of a BPT implies that there exists 〈x, y, c〉 ∈ ΩT such that
GT2(x, y, c) > 0. (A.9) hence imply that (iii) in the definition of (BP) holds for T .
Let 〈x, y, c〉, 〈x¯, y¯, c¯〉 ∈ ΩT such that x1 ≥ x¯1, y1 ≥ y¯1, c ≤ c¯ and 〈x1, y1, c〉 6= 〈x¯1, y¯1, c¯〉.
Then part (a) of (iv) in the definition of a BPT and (A.9) imply
g(x, y, c) = GT2(x, y, c) ≥ GT2(x¯
1, x¯2, y¯1, y¯2, c¯) = g(x¯, y¯, c¯) (A.10)
Hence, part (a) of (iv) in the definition of (BP) holds for T .
Let 〈x, y, c〉, 〈x¯, y¯, c¯〉 ∈ ΩT such that g(x, y, c) > g(x¯, y¯, c¯). Then (A.9)implies that
GT2(x, y, c) > GT2(x¯, y¯, c¯). (A.11)
(A.11) and part (b) of (iv) in the definition of a BPT imply that 〈x1, y1, c〉 6= 〈x¯1, y¯1, c¯〉
and it is not the case that x1 ≤ x¯1, y1 ≤ y¯1, and c ≥ c¯. This proves that part (b) of (iv)
in the definition of (BP) holds for T and similarly, we can prove that part (c) of (iv) in
the definition of a BPT implies part (c) of (iv) in the definition of (BP).
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For j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m, it follows from (3.14) and Assumption (b) of the theorem that
f j(x, y−j , c, z) := max{yj ∈ R+| yj ∈ P (x, y−j , c, z)}
= max{yj ∈ R+| yj ∈ PT1(x, y−j , c, z) ∩R+}
=F jT1(x, y−j , c, z).
(A.12)
Let 〈x, y−j , c, z〉, 〈x¯, y¯−j , c¯, z¯〉 ∈ ΞjT with x ≥ x¯, y−j ≤ y¯−j , and c ≤ c¯. Then (A.12) and
part (a) of Remark 1 imply that
f j(x, y−j , c, z) = F jT1(x, y−j , c, z) ≥ F
j
T1(x¯, y¯
−j , c¯, z). (A.13)
Assumption (a) of the theorem implies that
PT1(x¯, y¯
−j , c¯, z) = PT1(x¯, y¯
−j , c¯, z¯) (A.14)
(A.12), (A.13), and (A.14) imply that
f j(x, y−j , c, z) = F jT1(x, y−j , c, z) ≥ F
j
T1(x¯, y¯
−j , c¯, z) = F jT1(x¯, y¯−j , c¯, z¯) = f j(x¯, y¯−j , c¯, z¯).
(A.15)
This shows that part (a) of (v) in the definition of (BP) holds for T .
For j = m1+1, . . . ,m, let 〈x, y−j , c, z〉, 〈x¯, y¯−j , c¯, z¯〉 ∈ ΞjT and f j(x, y−j , c, z) > f j(x¯, y¯−j , c¯, z¯).
Then (A.12) and (A.14) imply that
F jT1(x, y−j , c, z) > F
j
T1(x¯, y¯
−j , c¯, z¯)
= F jT1(x¯, y¯−j , c¯, z).
(A.16)
(A.16) and part (b) of Remark 1 imply that 〈x, y−j , c〉 6= 〈x¯, y¯−j , c¯〉 and it is not the case
that x ≤ x¯, y−j ≥ y¯−j , and c ≥ c¯. This shows that part (b) of (v) in the definition of
(BP) holds for T .
T satisfies (CDB) follows from Assumption (a) of the theorem and the facts that T2
satisfies (iii) in the definition of a BPT, g() = GT2(), and g¯() = G¯T2(). T satisfies (RIFD)
and (ROFD) follow from Assumption (b) of the theorem and the fact that T1 satisfies (iii)
in the definition of a IPT.
Proof of Theorem 5: (1) follows in an obvious manner and (2) follows once, given any
j = m1 + 1, . . . ,m, we define the sets
T1 :=
{〈x, y, 0, c, 0, 0, z〉 ∈ Rn+2(m+2)+ | ∃ 〈x¯, y¯−j , c¯〉 ∈ ΘjT such that x ≥ x¯ ∧ y−j ≤ y¯−j
∧ c ≤ c¯ ∧ yj ≤ ρj(x¯, y¯−j , c¯)
}
and
T2 :=
{〈x, 0, y, 0, c, z, 0〉 ∈ Rn+2(m+2)+ | 〈x, y−j , c〉 ∈ ΘjT ∧ σ¯j(x, y−j , c) ≥ z ≥ σj(x, y−j , c)}.
(A.17)
T1 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ and T2 ⊂ Rn+2(m+2)+ satisfy the definitions of an IPT and a BPT,
respectively and T = T (T1, T2).
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